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From Reynolds v. Sims to City of
Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White
Suburbs Commandeered the
Fifteenth Amendment?
By JAMES U. BLACKSHER* AND LARRY T. MENEFEEt

In 1964, citizens of Birmingham, Mobile and Gadsden, Alabama,
convinced the United States Supreme Court that the Constitution guar-

antees equal voting rights for white people. The problem presented in
Reynolds v. Sims' grew out of the Alabama Legislature's refusal since
1901 to reapportion itself. The legislature in 1964 was tightly con-

trolled by the thinly populated, rural "Black Belt" 2 counties, many of
which had majority black populations that effectively were prevented
from voting.3 Only after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did

B.S., 1962, University of Utah; J.D., 1971, University of Alabama School of Law.
B.S., 1968, Auburn University; J.D., 1971, University of Alabama School of Law.
1. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2. See R. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 160-63 (1970); Comment, Alabama's UnrepresentatieLegislature, 14 ALA. L. REv. 403, 406 (1962).
3. An understanding of the history of black suffrage is essential. Whites, who controlled government at all state and local levels, employed devices such as literacy tests and
poll taxes to prevent blacks from registering to vote, even after passage of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. See United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95, 96-97 (M.D. Ala. 1966). Race
has been the dominant political question in Alabama since 1865. See generally S. HACK*

t

NEY, POPULISM TO PROGRESSIVISM IN ALABAMA (1969); V. KEY,SOUTHERN PoLITIcs IN
STATE AND NATION (1949); . KOuSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS (1970); S.
LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH 1944-1969 (1976); M. McMILLAN, CONSTrrUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA, 1798-1901: A STUDY IN POLITICS, THE

NEGRO AND SECTIONALISM (1955). While detailed discussion is not possible here, of most
importance for immediate purposes is a realization of the easy interplay between societal
approval of extra-legal discrimination affecting the right to vote (violence and economic
coercion), with state-sanctioned discrimination (changing registration qualifications and voting procedures). Both have been used at particular times in history to minimize black participation. It was black participation at any level, not black control, that was feared. Even a
small minority of 193 blacks and creoles voting in Mobile, Alabama, city elections in 1908
was feared because those voters might form influential coalitions with white politicians.
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1063-64 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
In Alabama, from admission to the Union in 1819 until passage of the Reconstruction
Acts in 1867, suffrage was restricted to white males over 21 years of age. From 1867 until
the so-called "compromise" of 1877, federal troops, to an extent, protected the right of
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black Alabamans gain access to the polls. 4 The conflict underlying the
apportionment issue in Reynolds v. Sims, therefore, pitted the fastgrowing white suburbs against a dwindling white "oligarchy" in the
5
rural Black Belt counties.

Two years before Reynolds, the Supreme Court had ruled justiciable the malapportionment claims of Tennessee's big cities, 6 thus ending
decades of steadfast refusal by state and federal courts to enter the
"political thicket" of reapportionment cases. 7 Consequently, the task
facing the Reynolds plaintiffs was to identify what constitutional rights
blacks to vote. Violence, intimidation and vote fraud, especially in the black belt, regained
control for the white supremacists. However, the extralegal methods were not totally secure
or philosophically satisfactory in a "democracy," so legal restrictions were devised. M.
KOUSSER, supra, at 45-47. See also infra note 255.
In 1894, Congress repealed nearly all of the prior civil rights acts. On the state level
efforts were increased to legalize the white control that, in large part, had been achieved
through extralegal means. The changes usually were billed as reforms and included more
onerous registration requirements and more complicated ballots. These changes reduced
black turnout by 22%. M. KoUSSER, supra, at 138. In 1901, Alabama held a Constitutional
Convention that made white control even more secure. The constitution provided that veterans and their descendents, persons who could read and write English and were employed,
and persons who owned property with an assessed value of $300 or more could vote. They
could vote if they had not been convicted of any of a long list of petty crimes and were
current in payment of their poll taxes. These provisions caused a 98% drop in black registration and a 13% drop in white registration. McMillan, supra, at 352-53. Other forms of
societal segregation were also legalized. Streetcars, parks, residential housing and public
meetings were formally segregated by law. Jim Crow was in place.
4. From approximately 1915 to 1944 the efforts of white supremacists primarily were
aimed at maintaining and defending their complete control. In 1944, the Supreme Court
struck down the all-white Democratic Party primary. Smith v. Allwight, 321 U.S. 649
(1944). The reintroduction of the federal presence via the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1964
and 1965 eventually removed most of the formal legal barriers to black voting. Blacks in
Alabama, however, still face both legal and extralegal barriers to participation. That blacks
in Alabama have lower registration rates, lower turnout rates, and disproportionately lower
candidate recruitment rates than do whites is attributable to these barriers. See Hale
County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206, 1213-14, 1217 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge
court). The petty crimes provision still exists. ALA. CONST. § 182. The 1981 Alabama legislature passed voter re-registration laws for at least five rural counties in which black voters
had begun to approach a majority. After 15 years of working to get blacks registered the
entire process had to be done again in nine months. Though a substantial loss of black
registrants is expected the exact amount is not known at this time. J. Cox and A. Turner,
The Voting Rights Act in Alabama 11 (June 1981) (unpublished report by Legal Services
Corp. of Ala.). Past de jure discrimination in education, employment and voting directly
affects the political socialization of the black community, and hence its ability to participate
effectively. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON VOTING RIGHTS
ACT EXTENSION, H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-21 (1981); Lawson, supra note
3, at 1.
5. R. CORTNER, supra note 2, at 161; M. MCMILLAN, supra note 3, at 307.
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1962).
7. E.g. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); accord Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 388 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also R. CORTNER, supra note 2, at 162-63.
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and remedies were available to them. The Supreme Court held in

Reynolds that the fourteenth amendment requires state legislatures to
apportion themselves by population. 8 The new constitutional rule of
one person, one vote was born 9 over strong objections from Justices
Harlan, Stewart, and Clark, who contended that the Constitution
neither expressed nor implied such a substantive principle. The Reynolds majority, however, relied on the growing list of decisions prohibiting racial discrimination in voting under the fifteenth amendment to
find in the fourteenth amendment an analogous, though unspoken,

principle proscribing undervaluation of citizens' votes resulting from
improper apportionment. This transposition of fifteenth amendment
principles into the fourteenth amendment provided white urban voters
representation in the Alabama Legislature in proportion to their
numbers.
. In the decisions following Reynolds, the Court recognized that the

new one-person, one-vote standard could be satisfied by creation of
multimember districts10 or at-large voting plans" that would be likely
to disadvantage racial minorities,12 the groups protected by the
8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
9. Actually, the phrase "one person, one vote" first appeared in Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), in which the Court struck down
Georgia's county unit system of weighted voting.
10. A multimember district in a legislative apportionment scheme is one in which all
the voters of the district in common elect more than one representative. The multimember
district may consist of several counties, eg., Fortron v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 435 (1965), or a
single county, eg., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 128 (1971). Single-member districts,
in which the voters of the district elect only one representative, are the most common form
of representation in the United States. GrofmanAternativesto Single-memberPluralityDistricts:Legal andEmpiricalIssues, 9 Poi'Y STUD. J. 875 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Grofman,
Alternatives]. But, as of 1980, the upper house in 13 states and the lower house in 22 states
utilized some multimember districts. Id at 889 n.l.
11. An at-large voting plan is the "polar type" of multimember districting, that is, one
in which all voters in the political jurisdiction (state, county, municipality, etc.) vote for one
or more members of the jurisdiction's representative body (legislature, county commission,
city council, etc.). Grofman, Alternatives, supra note 10, at 875. At-large voting is most
frequently employed in electing local governments. There is a wide variety of at-large
schemes; e.g., some permit election by plurality (the top vote-getters are elected even if none
wins a majority) and others require majority-vote runoffs, some employ residency subdistricts and others permit the winners to reside anywhere in the jurisdiction, and some prohibit
single-shot or "bullet" voting (a voter may cast a ballot for just one candidate even if several
positions are to be elected) and others require full-slate voting (a voter must cast a ballot for
each seat to be filled). See, ag., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183-84 (1980).
12. "The 'winner-take-all' character of the typical election scheme creates the possibility that a specific majority will elect all the representatives from a multimember district
whereas the outvoted minority might have been able to elect some representatives if the
multimember district had been broken down into several single-member districts." L.
ThmE, AmnmcAN CONsTrtunoNAL LAW 750 (1978).
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fifteenth amendment. The Court twice considered the question
whether such voting plans were constitutional, reaching apparently
conflicting conclusions and articulating no uniform, manageable standards.' 3 Not until 1980 was such a standard offered by the Court. In
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 14 the Court reversed a ruling that at-large
voting in Mobile city elections unconstitutionally diluted the votes of
the black minority.' 5 The Court was deeply divided, with no majority
rationale for reversal. A plurality led by Justice Stewart held that black
voters would have to prove a racially invidious purpose behind the atlarge plan in order to prevail. Subsequently, in Rogers v. Lodge, 16 a
majority of the Court approved the Bolden plurality's intent
requirement.
The standards of proof adopted by the Supreme Court have, in
effect, elevated the right of population equality created in Reynolds to a
position of constitutional primacy. Yet the primary purpose of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was to safeguard the rights of racial minorities. The Supreme Court's enunciation of a higher standard
of proof for cases involving racial vote dilution 7 than that required to
challenge population malapportionment 8 has created an intolerable
inversion of historical and constitutional priorities.' 9 It appears that,
for the moment, the white majority in Mobile may have commandeered the fifteenth amendment.
In addition, none of the standards proposed by various members
of the Court would result in the judicial manageability that has been
sought in such cases since Baker v. Carr.20 Any standard for measuring
unconstitutional vote dilution must (1) assure commensurate protection
for the voting strength of the racial minorities and majority alike, and
(2) provide a judicially manageable standard of proof that neither outlaws multimember districts per se nor requires proportional
representation.
This Article reviews the evolution of the Reynolds doctrine and its
13.
14.
15.
16.

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Id at 80.
102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).

17. In general, racial vote dilution refers to an unfair undervaluation of the voting
strength of a politically cohesive racial group. An attempt to define this phenomenon more
concretely, at least as it occurs in at-large or multimember district schemes, is the object of
this Article.
18. As used here, population malapportionment refers to situations where representatives of geographical districts represent substantially unequal numbers of people.
19. See Derfner, Pro Affirmative Action in Districting, 9 POL'Y STUD. J. 851 (1981).
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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impact on racial minorities, suggesting that constitutional priorities
have been misplaced as a result of the Court's inability to discover judicially manageable standards for multimember district vote dilution.
The Article then criticizes the competing theories in Bolden and Rogers
and, finally, proposes a standard of proof that reconciles the implied
constitutional right of majority rule with the explicit constitutional demand for the protection of racial groups.
Judicial Development of the Constitutional Right of
Majoritarian Rule
In 1971, Justice Harlan wrote that the reapportionment decisions
of the 1960's "can be best understood . . . as reflections of deep personal commitments by some members of the Court to the principles of
pure majoritarian democracy."'2 ' Any analysis of the constitutional implication of at-large elections must begin with a review of how a fundamental constitutional right of majority control came to be recognized.
Baker v. Carr: The Question of Manageability
In Baker v. Carr,22 urban Tennessee voters complained that mass
migration to the cities since the last reapportionment of the state legislature in 1901 had caused the apportionment statute to become "unconstitutional and obsolete."' ' The less populated rural counties, the city
plaintiffs argued, enjoyed disproportionate political strength.24 Departing from what was thought to be well-established precedent, 25 the
Supreme Court ruled that the complaint stated a justiciable claim
under the fourteenth amendment and sent the case back to the lower
court. 26 The majority accepted the argument of Solicitor General Archibald Cox 27 that, notwithstanding the political nature of the controversy, a constitutional violation could be detected by reference to "well
developed and familiar" equal protection standards. 2 8 The Court did
not delineate, however, the elements of proof that would entitle the
21. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 166 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (emphasis in
original).
22. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23. Id at 193.
24. Id at 204-05 & n.23. The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, as amicus
curiae, told the Court that this rural/urban political imbalance existed in the majority of the
states' legislatures. Id at 248 n.4 (Douglas, J., concurring).
25. See id at 232-34, 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
26. Id at 237.
27. Cox submitted an amicus brief.
28. 369 U.S. at 226.
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underrepresented counties to relief or the shape of judicial remedies
that would be permitted.
The majority opinion repudiated earlier cases holding that malapportionment controversies presented inherently nonjusticiable political
questions. 29 According to Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, a
dominant characteristic of political questions was "the lack of satisfac-"3 Justice Brennan altory criteria for a judicial determination ....
might be "so enmeshed
case
a
particular
lowed for the possibility that
with those political question elements which render Guaranty Clause
claims nonjusticiable" 3 ' that it would defy equal protection treatment.
Unlike admittedly nonjusticiable guaranty clause claims, he asserted,
attacks on malapportioned state legislatures could be addressed on a
reflects
case-by-case basis, to determine if the alleged "discrimination
32
action.
capricious
and
arbitrary
no policy, but simply
The Baker majority sidestepped the task of articulating a manageable equal protection standard, even for the case at hand, and stopped
short of proposing any substantive constitutional right to apportionment by equal population. A pointed dictum in the majority opinion,
however, described the concept of impairing voting rights by "dilution"
and recognized the plaintiffs' "interest in maintaining the effectiveness
'33
of their votes."
A significant feature of the majority opinion in Baker v. Carr was
its reliance on fifteenth amendment cases to support its two major
premises: (1) merely because legislative apportionments dealt with the
allocation of political strength among groups of voters, they did not
necessarily present nonjusticiable political questions; 34 and (2) apportionments may infringe voting rights that are subject to protection
under the fourteenth amendment. 35 Alleged violations of rights guaranteed to racial minorities by the fifteenth amendment could be lifted
"out of the so-called 'political' arena and [placed] into the conventional
sphere of constitutional litigation," because these rights were clearly
36
appropriate subjects for judicial intervention in state electoral affairs.
These fifteenth amendment precedents, the Baker majority thought,
29.

Id

at 232-37.

30. Id at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)).
31. Id at 227.
32. Id at 226 (emphasis in original).
33. Id at 208.
34. Id at 229-31 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1961)).
35. Id at 207-08 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Exparte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 (1880)).
36.

369 U.S. at 230 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1961)).
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provided reliable assurance that at least some forays into the 37political
thicket of apportionment could be managed by the judiciary.
In his famous dissent, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice

Harlan, disagreed with the majority's reliance on fifteenth amendment
case law to justify the discovery of population-based voting rights in
the fourteenth amendment. 38 Justice Frankfurter admitted that "an explicit and clear constitutional imperative" guided judicial intervention
in state government on the issue of black disfranchisement, 39 but he
discovered no reference to a right to "representation proportioned to

the fourteenth amendment and
the geographic spread of population" in
40

argued that none had been intended.
Aside from his view that the fourteenth amendment was not in-

tended to provide a general basis for regulating the apportionment process, Justice Frankfurter voiced three reasons that population
malapportionment claims were inappropriate subjects for judicial consideration: (1) the need to avoid federal judicial involvement in legisla-

tive policy making, (2) the difficulty of devising manageable standards
41
for judgment, and (3) the problem of providing proper remedies. Of
these three, the "dominant consideration" was the lack of manageable

standards. 42 The limitless practical and political factors that must inform a fair apportionment scheme were too complex for courts to
standardize. 43 Justice Frankfurter feared that, absent any clear consti-

tutional mandate, the justices' "private views of political wisdom
37. Id at 227, 230.
38. "[Tlhe relationship between population and legislative representation [is] a wholly
different matter from denial of the franchise to individuals because of race, color, religion or
sex." Id at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 285-86. "For here the controlling command of Supreme Law is plain and
unequivocal. An end of discrimination against the Negro was the compelling motive of the
Civil War Amendments. The Fifteenth expresses this in terms, and it is no less true of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth." Id
40. Id at 301. "To find such a political conception legally enforceable in the broad
and unspecific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the Constitution." Id at 300.
41. Id at 277-78.
42. Id at 282-83.
43. "Manifestly, the Equal Protection Clause supplies no clearer guide for judicial examination of apportionment methods than would the Guarantee Clause itself. Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving-even after the
fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a representative legislature have been fought out or compromised--considerations of geography, demography,
electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local
groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and the
city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of
long experience and senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant
data, and a host of others." Id at 323 (footnote omitted).
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[would become] the measure of the Constitution. .... 44
Justice Harlan's separate dissent, seconding Justice Frankfurter's
focus on the problem of manageability, went a step further, concluding
that "lack [of] standards by which to decide such cases as this, is relevant not only to the question of 'justiciability,' but also, and perhaps
more fundamentally, to the determination whether any cognizable constitutional claim has been asserted in this case."'45 As apportionment
issues were "basically matters appropriate only for legislative judgment," there could be no fourteenth amendment violation "so long as
a possible rational legislative policy" was available to support the
plan. 46 According to Justice Harlan, most members of the Court
agreed that there was no constitutional violation "merely because [the
apportionment plan] favors rural voters."' 47 He rejected the suggestion
that the equal protection clause required giving equal weight to each
person's vote and thought it was "surely beyond argument" that apportionment decisions had to take into account "factors other than bare
48
numbers."
Justices Clark and Stewart wrote separate concurring opinions.
Justice Clark agreed with the dissenters that the equal protection clause
did not require either population equality among districts or more than
a rational basis to uphold legislative apportionments. 4 9 But he also
insisted that the judgment of the Court was not based on theories to the
contrary. 50 Justice Clark simply concluded that Tennessee's apportionment had strayed so far from its original design that it was totally irrational, a "crazy quilt." 5 1 Justice Stewart declined to reach the merits at
all, basing his vote for reversal on the yet untested allegation of the
is utterly arbicomplaint "that Tennessee's system of apportionment
52
trary-without any justification in rationality.
The divided Court in Baker v. Carr thus opened the federal courts
to claims that the Constitution afforded voters some still undefined pro44. Id at 301.
45. Id at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. Justice Harlan set out his own list of economic, social, and political considerations that could provide a rational basis for Tennessee's legislative apportionment, even as
he acknowledged "the fact that the foremost apparent legislative motivation has been to
preserve the electoral strength of the rural interests notwithstanding shifts in population."
Id at 348.
47. Id at 348-49.
48. Id at 332-33.
49. Id. at 258 (Clark, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 254.
51. Id
52. Id at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tection against inequitable reapportionment. Commentators volunteered a variety of theories for shaping the substantive principles that
would govern future scrutiny of malapportionment claims, 5 3 but recognized that the key to the new jurisprudence would be judicial
54
manageability.
Reynolds v. Sims: A New Fundamental Constitutional Right Is Born
Two years after Baker v. Carr, the Court attempted to articulate a
manageable equal protection apportionment standard. In Reynolds v.
Sims, 55 over the strong objections of Justices Stewart, Clark, and
Harlan, the majority concluded that the "easily demonstrable ' 5 6 rule of
one person, one vote was the "fundamental goal" and "plain objective"
of the Constitution. 57 The Court rejected the traditional equal protection rationality yardstick and established a new affirmative, fundamental constitutional right based on population. Since the new "equal
population 58 principle was determined to be an affirmative constitutional right of the individual voter, 59 the federal courts could avoid the
political implications of sorting rational legislative apportionment goals
60
from irrational ones.
The Reynolds majority found a right to equal voting strength in
the fourteenth amendment by referring to earlier fifteenth amendment
race discrimination precedents. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
majority, considered it "undeniabl[e]. . .that all qualified voters have
a constitutionally protected right to vote and to have their votes
counted." 6 1 This critical assertion, the constitutional predicate of a
one-person, one-vote rule, was supported solely by a long list of
fifteenth amendment decisions dealing with racial discrimination
against black voters. 62 These fifteenth amendment cases, the majority
53. E.g., articles cited in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377
U.S. 713, 746 n.9 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Carpeneti, LegislativeApportionment: Multimember Districts and FairRepresentation, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 666, 667 n.10 (1972).
54. E.g., Comment, Baker v. Carrand LegislativeApportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968 (1963).
55. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56. Id at 563.
57. Id at 559-60.
58. Id at 587.
59. Id at 577.
60. "Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is
approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." Id at 579.
61. Id at 554.
62. See id at 554-55 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Smith v. Allwight,
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thought, held the key to discovery of "manageable standards" under
the equal protection clause as well. 63 Because "the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments prohibit a State from overweighting or diluting
votes on the basis of race or sex," 64 the Court inferred that the fourteenth amendment prohibited diluting any citizen's vote on the basis of
population or geographic residence. 65 The majority opinion concluded
that "[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one
person, one vote."' 66 Historical, economic, and other group interests, no
matter how legitimate, could not justify more than a minor deviation
67
from the equal population norm.
Justices Clark, Stewart and Harlan 68 continued to disagree vigorously with the notion of a constitutional right of population equality.
Justice Stewart's dissent in the companion case, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
GeneralAssembly of Colorado,69 provides an appropriate focus on the
fundamental differences between the majority and the dissenters.
In his dissent in Lucas, Justice Stewart sharply criticized the analysis of the Reynolds majority which found in the fourteenth amendment
protection against voting strength dilution. 70 He contended that the reapportionment cases had nothing to do with any person's right to vote,
nor did they involve the right to have a vote counted. 7 1 The fifteenth
amendment voting rights cases, therefore, were inapposite. 7 2 Justice
Stewart agreed with earlier arguments of Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan, based on historical evidence, that the fourteenth amendment
was not intended to confer voting rights and, more particularly, was not
73
intended to inhibit the states' power to make apportionment policy.
321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383
(1915); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651

(1884); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)).
63. 377 U.S. at 557.
64. Id (emphasis added).
65. Id at 557-61.
66. Id at 558 (quoting Justice Douglas in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
67. Id at 579-80.
68. Justice Frankfurter was no longer on the Court.
69. 377 U.S. 713, 744 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 745 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71. Id at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. Id at 744.
73. Id at 745-46 n.6 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 266, 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). One point made by Justice
Harlan in Reynolds was that the mere need for the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments
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The Reynolds majority based its holding, however, on a much
broader principle than population equality, defining the denial of equal
voting rights to include any form of underweighting or diluting the
strength of a citizen's vote. 74 The majority acknowledged that the ap-

portionment process is "complex and many-faceted," involving "factors other than population. '75 It did not limit, therefore, its
constitutional view of effective representation to geographic malapportionments. Rather, the majority condemned undervaluations of citizens' voting power "by any method or means, ' 76 "no matter what their
form."' 77 Specifically included among the prohibited dilutive factors
was racial discrimination; indeed, race cases decided under both the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were cited as the primary support
78
for the broader requirement of effective representation.

Nevertheless, at least in terms of judicial standards, the Reynolds

majority clearly implied that the newly discovered equal population
rule should enjoy primacy among other considerations, including
race. 79 This priority reflects the fact that population malapportionment
verified the absence in the fourteenth amendment of any protection of voting rights. 377
U.S. at 611-12. Further, it was "highly implausible" that the fourteenth amendment should
authorize federal judicial regulation of state legislative apportionments while leaving the
right to vote itself unprotected. Id at 612. Justice Harlan therefore reached the "inescapable" conclusion that the Reynolds majority had relegated the fifteenth amendment to
the "limbo of constitutional anachronisms." 1d
74. "And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." 377 U.S. at 555. This conclusion, said the Court, flowed from the bedrock principle of representative government: "Each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full
and effective participation in the political processes of his [s]tate's legislative bodies......
Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that
each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature. Modem and viable state government needs, and the Constitution demands, no less."
Id at 565.
75. Id at 566.
76. Id at 563.
77. Id at 563 n.40 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569-71 (1946) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
78. Id at 563 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960); Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (condemning "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination")). "Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendmenttest as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race ... ." 377 U.S. at 566 (citing Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1955)) (emphasis added).
79. "Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling
criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies." 377 U.S. at 567. See
Auerbach, The ReapportionmentCase . One Person, One Vote--One Vote, One Value, 1964
Sup. CT. REv. 1, 12.
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is "easily demonstrable, 8 0° and its dilutive effect is obvious, regardless
of the legislators' otherwise benign motives. 8 1 As for minority groups,
the Court was convinced that they were given ample constitutional protection even as it made the right of majoritarian rule the paramount
82
constitutional concern.
Again Justice Stewart strenuously disagreed, finding the apparent
simplicity and manageability of the one-person, one-vote rule illusory,
both ideologically and practically.8 3 As a matter of political reality,
legislative apportionment had to be concerned with too many other important factors to be reduced to a mere numbers game. Apportionment, Justice Stewart thought, was "a process of accommodating group
interests, '8 4 guided by the ideal of ensuring "effective representation
85
. . . of the various groups and interests making up the electorate.
Justice Stewart contended that, in practice, apportionment had to
approximate the ideal of effective representation "by a realistic accommodation of the diverse and often conflicting political forces operating
within the State."8s6 Consequently, the measure of the fairness of an
apportionment scheme could not be reduced to the equation of one
person, one vote.87 He viewed with alarm the danger that the new
equal population rule would
forever [freeze] one theory of political thought into our Constitution,
and forever [deny] to every State any opportunity for enlightened
and progressive innovation in the design of its democratic institutions, so as to accommodate within a system of representative government the interests and aspirations of diverse groups of people,
by a
without subjecting any group or class to absolute domination
88
geographically concentrated or highly organized majority.
In Justice Stewart's opinion, population factors were secondary to the
of the regional, soprimary goal of achieving "balanced representation
'8 9
cial and economic interests within a State."
80. 377 U.S. at 563.
81. Id at 562-63, 565, 579-80.
82. Id at 565-66.
83. Justice Stewart objected that "[w]e are not told how or why the vote of a person in a
more populated legislative district is 'debased,' or how he is less a citizen, nor is the proposition self-evident." Lucas, 377 U.S. at 746.
84. Id at 749.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Justice Stewart called the population equality standard an "uncritical, simplistic,
and heavy-handed application of sixth-grade arithmetic." Id at 750.
88. Id at 748-49.
89. Id at 751. Justice Stewart saw a "strongly felt American tradition" of preventing
the submergence of the society's many diverse interests "by the majority's monolithic command." Id He stated succinctly his idea of the correct constitutional standard: "I think
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Both Justice Stewart in Lucas and Justice Harlan in Reynolds argued that, aside from the doubtful constitutional underpinnings of the
one-person, one-vote rule, its adoption did not provide manageable criteria for judgment. It gave the states and the courts no guidance, for
example, about the number of districts required or permitted, and the
shape of boundaries. 90 Further, no standard was offered to govern the
use of single-member, multimember, or combination schemes.9 1 Prophetically, and ominously from the standpoint of racial minorities, Justice Stewart warned: "I do not understand why the Court's
constitutional rule does not require the abolition of districts and the
holding of all elections at large." 92
Although the one-person, one-vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims was
93
unequivocal and was greeted with general approval by the nation,
serious questions remained about the ultimate shape of the new rule,
including what state and local governmental bodies would be subject to
it, what deviations from absolute mathematical equality would be tolerated by the Court, what remedies would be required, and, in particular, how the vulnerable interests of geographically insular racial
minorities would be safeguarded now that majority rule was the para94
mount law of the land.
that the Equal Protection Clause demands but two basic attributes of any plan of state legislative apportionment. First, it demands that, in the light of the State's own characteristics
and needs, the plan must be a rational one. Secondly, it demands that the plan must be such
as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the
State." Id at 753-54. It is not clear why Justice Stewart omitted from this thumbnail rule
his earlier reference to the importance of avoiding the total submergence of minority groups.
I.d at 748-49.
90. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 750 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 621
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
91. Renolds, 377 U.S. at 621.
92. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 750 (footnote omitted).
93. Dean McKay wrote in 1968 that criticism of the Reapportionment Cases had
"faded to a whisper." McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67
MICH. L. REv. 223, 228 (1968). He explained why: "Direct frontal attack on the decisionsby constitutional 'amendment or otherwise-was probably never destined to make much
progress for the simple reason that the public did not oppose the decisions. This should not
have been surprising since malapportionment had worked to the disadvantage of a majority
of all the voters, including the politically sophisticated and highly vocal groups in the cities
and suburbs." Id at 229; see also Auerbach, supra note 79, at 70-72.
94. Paul Freund correctly noted that standards for judicial treatment of gerrymandering and weighted or fractional voting in state legislatures also remained unsettled. Freund,
Foreword to R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION AND REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW
AND PoLITIcs (1968). But see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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Refining Reynolds: The Continuing Importance of Manageability
In 1968, the one-person, one-vote rule was extended to local government apportionments in Avery v. Midland County.95 Justice White,
writing for a five-member majority, held that the Reynolds rule extended to all local representative bodies with "general governmental
powers," including, for example, the power to assess and tax property,
to issue bonds, and to allocate funds within a political subdivision. The
Court struck down Midland County's districting system, because the
Constitution "permits no substantial variation from equal population
in drawing districts .... -96
In separate dissents, Justices Harlan, Fortas, and Stewart argued
that the A very decision ignored the realities of local political processes
and unnecessarily restricted the ability of states to experiment with varieties of municipal forms of government. 97 Although Justice Fortas
did not disagree that local governments should be bound by Reynolds
insofar as it proscribed apportionment schemes that in fact debased the
voting strength of any group, 98 he contended that true voting equality
had to be measured by "a complex of values and factors, and not
merely the arithmetic simplicity of one equals one." 99 Justices Harlan
and Stewart, on the other hand, expressed their continuing opposition
in any context to the one-person, one-vote rule of Reynolds.1° °
In spite of the dissenters' strong reservations about the appropriateness of the one-person, one-vote rule, the simplicity of the population equality rule was precisely what attracted the Court's majority.
Strict and comprehensive application of the rule to local bodies
avoided the necessity of devising standards to detect when municipal
apportionment schemes actually diluted the fundamental voting rights
discerned in Reynolds. Otherwise, as Justice White pointed out, the
Court, when faced with arguments that local government functions
0
were "administrative" or "executive" as opposed to "legislative,"' '1
would have to determine in each case whether the state legislature had
95. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
96. Id at 483-85.
97. Id at 490-94 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 496-97 (Fortas, J., dissenting), 509 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
98. Id at 497-99 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 496 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Harlan felt bound to follow Reynolds, but not to extend it. Id at 487-88.
Justice Stewart persisted in the view that legislative apportionment at both the state and
local levels was "too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic." Id at 510.
101. Id at 481-82.
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delegated sufficient power to the local government to trigger Reynolds
rights.10 2 The population equality principle gained stature and was extended as an established rule of equal protection in large part because
its simplicity of statement was thought to provide a judicially manageable standard.
Yet, even in its most straightforward application, the one-person,
one-vote rule did not relieve the Court of the burden of seeking out
more flexible standards for handling the variegated, intensely political
problems of apportionment. One of the first questions facing the Court
was what degree of variance from absolute population equality constitutionally could be tolerated. The invidious malapportionments in
Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims had been obvious. But much
smaller deviations in subsequent cases 3forced the Court to admit that
10
precise equality would be impossible.
In the early cases following Reynolds, the Court placed the burden
on the states to justify more than de minimis or "minor" deviations
from "pure' population equality. °4 Strict mathematical equality was
0 5
and Wells
urged most strongly by the Court in Kirkpatrickv. Preisler1
06
v. Rockefeller, companion congressional redistricting cases. Both
majority opinions, written by Justice Brennan, declared that any relaxation of the Court's demand for districts drawn as close as practically
possible to mathematical equality would encourage legislatures not to
aim for exact equality. 10 7 The majority interpreted Reynolds to establish strict population equality as the "basic" constitutional command,
one that overrode even concerns about diluting the effective representation of "distinct social and economic interests."108 Justices Harlan,
Stewart, and White dissented, charging that the majority had repudiated the Reynolds rule that exact mathematical equality was not constitutionally required.' °9
In their quest for judicial manageability, the three Kirkpatrick102. Id at 484-85.
103. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1966).
104. See Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 122 (1967); Swam v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,44344 (1967). In Swarn, Justices Harlan and Stewart pointed out that such a rule stood on its
head the traditional judicial presumption of constitutional validity accorded state laws.
They would have left plaintiffs with the burden of proving that population variances had an
"invidious purpose ... or effect." Id at 447-48.
105. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
106. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
107. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531; Wells, 394 U.S. at 546.
108. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533.
109. Wells, 394 U.S. at 550.
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Wells dissenters and Justice Fortas, concurring, 10o contended that the
majority had allowed apparent simplicity to distract them from the
constitutional predicates of Reynolds v. Sims, resulting in what Justice
The dissenters argued that
White called "a confusion of priorities."'
[tloday's decisions on the one hand require precise adherence to
admittedly inexact census figures, and on the other downgrade a restraint on a far greater potential threat to equality of representation,
the gerrymander. Legislatures intent on minimizing the representation of selected political or racial groups are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact districts so long as they adhere to
which we know
population equality among districts using standards
2
and they know are sometimes quite incorrect."
Soon after insisting on strict population equality in apportionment
plans, the Court, responding in part to the problems raised by Justice
White and the other Kirkpatrick dissenters, began a gradual retreat
from this position.
In Abate v. Mundt, 11 3 the Court recognized the lack of manageability inherent in Kirkpatrick's strict equality standard and approved a
county government apportionment that varied even more from population equality than had the Kirkpatrick districts. The Court named as
its reason for not insisting on strict equality the need for "flexibility in
municipal arrangements." ' 1 4 In Mahan v. Howell, 1 5 decided in 1973,
the Court limited the Kirkpatrick rule of strict mathematical equality to
congressional districting and announced a more flexible standard of
"substantial equality"'1 6 for state legislative apportionments. As further refined in the same Term by Gaffney v. Cummings," 7 the rule for
state apportionments placed the threshold burden on plaintiffs to show
a variance from substantial population equality" 8 and permitted the
states to rebut a prima facie case with a "rational" explanation rather
than with a demonstration of "governmental necessity." ' " 9
Both Mahan and Gaffney, in relaxing the Kirkpatrick rule, proclaimed renewed commitment to the proposition that pure population
equality, notwithstanding its superficial neatness, did not eliminate the
110. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 536 (Fortas, J., concurring).
111. Wells, 394 U.S. at 555 (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id
113.
114.
115.

403 U.S. 182 (1971).
Id at 185.
410 U.S. 315 (1973).

116. Id at 326.
117. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
118.
119.

Id at 740-41.
Mahan, 410 U.S. at 326.
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20
need to consider other factors that affected equal representation.
Justice White's majority opinion in Gaffney again warned of the affirmative constitutional danger that lay in relegating to the newfound right
of population equality too great a role in assuring equal protection in
2
apportionment schemes.' '
With the possible exception of its approach to congressional redistricting, 22 the Supreme Court today remains committed to a case-bycase evaluation of apportionment plans under the imprecise standards
of substantial equality and rational state interests. These standards
provide only minimal guidance for legislators or the lower federal
courts, who must weigh the continuous spectrum of possible mathematical variances and political concerns to discern violations of the equal
protection clause, even when the state plan is challenged solely on the
basis of population inequality.' 23 But while the imprecision of standards has not led the Court to downgrade the fundamental importance
of the population equality rule, its inability to discover judicially manageable standards for racial vote dilution appears to have relegated the
voting rights of racial minorities to an inferior constitutional status.

120. Justice Rehnquists majority opinion in Mahan v. Howell disputed the availability
of any "specialized calipers" for judging constitutionally permissible variances from population equality. Id at 329. Justice White's majority opinion in Gaffney reasserted the Court's
prior admissions that the population of districts "is just not that knowable to be used for
such refined judgments." 412 U.S. at 746. And he reminded Justice Brennan, whose dissent
urged full retention of the Kirkpatrick standards, of earlier cases that had recognized how
"other relevant factors" should be taken into account when searching for equal protection
violations in districting schemes. Id at 749.
121. "An unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures, a mere nose count inthe
districts, may submerge these other considerations and itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to an acceptable representation and
apportionment arrangement." 412 U.S. at 749.
122. See supra notes 113-14 & accompanying text.
123. There are strong inferences in the later reapportionment cases that states will not be
required to justify maximum population variances under 10%. See, e.g., Gaffiey v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 751; White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764-66 (1973); see also Connor v.
Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418, 420 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21 (1976); Cosner v.
Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350, 357 n.ll (E.D. Va. 1981) (three-judge court). But a careful reading of these cases shows that the Court has not given legislatures carte blanche under the
10% variation to draw district boundaries without due regard to the integrity of political
jurisdictions, compactness, contiguity and other established policies recognized by the states.
At best, within the 10% range, it appears that the burden of proof merely shifts to plaintiffs,
and even the demonstration of relatively high mean deviations may suffice to make out a
prima facie case. Exactly what burden of justification states must bear is far from clear as
reapportionment based on the 1980 census goes on. REAPPORTIONMENT: LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 12-19 (A. Wollock ed. 1980) (published by the National Conference of State
Legislatures).
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At-Large Vote Dilution: The Development
of Standards Avoided
Before City of Mobile v. Bolden
The question whether multimember districts, which by their nature provide perfect mathematical equality, nonetheless violate the
equal protection clause when they submerge the voting strength of racial minorities was one of the first post-Reynolds issues facing the
Court. But in Fortson v. Dorsey 124 the Court decided to postpone what
promised to be its most difficult task in forming manageable standards
for the fledgling constitutional right of one person, one vote. The ma25
jority declined to find multimember districts unconstitutional per se,'
but left open the possibility that in particular cases multimember districting would offend the equal protection clause if "designedly or
otherwise [it] would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
' 26
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."'
Fortson presented the archetypical dilemma of the multimember
district plan. Blacks in the Atlanta, Georgia, area contended that
countywide voting for all seven Fulton County state senators would
enable the white majority to prevent the election of even a single candidate favored by the residentially insular black voters. 127 The record
furnished no proof, however, that the apportionment plan actually
would operate in this fashion; 12 8 nor did plaintiffs attempt to prove that
the Georgia legislature engaged in a purposeful, racial gerrymander in
making Fulton County a multimember district. 129 Under these circumstances, the Court could discern no manageable standards that would
distinguish constitutional disapproval of the Fulton County plan from
blanket condemnation of all multimember districts. 130
By direct contrast, the population equality of the multimember
district was easily demonstrated,13 ' a factor that, coupled with the
Court's reluctance even to consider what evidentiary standards would
establish a violation of black voters' equal protection rights, further
buttressed the view that population equality was the supreme constitu124.
125.
126.
127.

379 U.S. 433 (1965).
Id at 436.
Id at 439.
Id at 437.

128. Id
129. Id at 439.
130. Id at 438.
131.

"There is clearly no mathematical disparity." Id at 437.
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tional voting principle. 132 Justice Harlan specially concurred in Fortson, warning against the suggestion that the political realities of the
apportionment process should take a back seat to expedient mathematical simplicity. 133 The Court failed, however, to engage in any thor-

ough exploration of the implications for racial minorities of the oneperson, one-vote rule.
34
The following year the Court decided Burns v. Richardson,
holding that federal courts may not restrict, beyond the clear commands of the equal protection clause, a state's freedom of choice to
devise a substitute for an apportionment plan found unconstitutional.
The lower court had disapproved Hawaii's proposal for multimember
senatorial districts on Oahu because the plan "enabl[ed] the same constituency to elect four representatives and three senators," without accounting for the "community of interests, community of problems,
socio-economic status, political and racial factors."' 3 5 In vacating the
decision, the Supreme Court maintained its presumption that mathematical equality alone ordinarily would guard against racial discrimination. 136 The Court repeated Fortson's call for particular proof that
minority vote dilution would occur "designedly or otherwise,"' 137 but
did not state what evidence of dilution would suffice. Dicta in Justice
Brennan's majority opinion, however, indicated that the Court desired
not proof of a purposeful gerrymander, but "the demonstration that a
particular multimember scheme effects an invidious result . .9138
The issue of submergence of minority voting strength was not addressed on the merits until 1971.139 In Whitcomb v. Chavis,140 a three132. Justice Brennan's majority opinion repeated with emphasis the passage from Reynolds that "the overriding objective must be substantialequality ofpopulationamong the various districts. .. ." Id at 436 (emphasis in original).
133. Id at 439-40. Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter, saw the same misplacement of
priorities. But neither could he articulate a manageable standard for detecting minority
dilution. "I have no idea how this weighted voting might produce prejudice race-wise, religion-wise, politics-wise." Id at 441-42. He therefore based his dissent, without any detailed
explication of reasons, on the theory that mixing single-member and multimember districts
violated the equal protection clause. Id
134. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
135. Id at 87.
136. Id at 88.
137. Id
138. Id The following term, Justice Harlan's dissent in Swanm v. Adams, 385 U.S. at
447-48, joined by Justice Stewart, reinforced the notion that an apportionment plan would
violate equal protection principles if it were shown to have either an invidious purpose or
effect-at least in the context of variations from mathematical equality.
139. In Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967), the Court affirmed without discussion the
district court's rejection of claims by black Texas voters that the state's legislative apportionment plan was infected by racial gerrymandering and by a crazy-quilt mixture of single-
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judge district court held unconstitutional Indiana's legislative reapportionment plan insofar as it established a single multimember district for
Marion County, including Indianapolis, but approved a twenty-eight
percent maximum population variance among the districts in the state.
The Supreme Court reversed on both counts, upholding the Marion
County multimember district, but rejecting the population variance as
too large.
Delivering the opinion of a deeply divided Court,' 4 1 Justice White
first reaffirmed that the underlying principles of Reynolds v. Sims protected minority groups from vote devaluation by multimember districts, just as they protected voters from mathematically
malapportioned districts. 42 He recalled that both the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments had been designed in particular "to protect the
civil rights of Negroes."'' 43 Significantly, the majority opinion concluded that multimember districting could violate the fourteenth
amendment by effectively denying blacks an equal opportunity "to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice,"' 144 even if the apportionment plan had not been purposefully
designed to dilute blacks' votes, that is, even if there had been no racial
gerrymandering. 45 The Court thus recognized that the one-person,
one-vote rule could result in a disadvantage to the intended beneficiaries of the fourteenth amendment.
Nevertheless, the majority could not agree that the record in Whitcomb v. Chavis contained sufficient proof of a constitutionally objectionable undervaluation of the black vote in Indianapolis. The
majority reversed the ruling against the multimember district because it
thought that the lower court's rationale promoted a theory of proportional representation. Justice White was particularly disturbed that the
district court had based its conclusion of unconstitutionality solely on
member and multimember districts that diluted black voting strength. Id at 121. Justice
Douglas alone wanted to reserve the racial vote dilution issue, but he admitted, "I am not
sure in my own mind how this problem should be resolved." Id at 126.
140. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
141. Justice White's opinion was joined in full by only three other members of the
Court. A fourth, Justice Stewart, joined those sections of Justice White's opinion which
upheld multimember districting but dissented from the holding that the population variances were too large. Id at 163. Justice Harlan filed a separate opinion. Id at 165-70.
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id at
171.
142. Id. at 141-44.
143. Id at 149.
144. Id.
145. Id at 149-55.
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46
the fact that disproportionately few blacks actually had been elected.
Blacks were regularly, if not proportionately, slated as candidates by
the Democrats, 47 and election returns exhibited bloc voting more
along party lines than along racial lines.' 48 When the Democrats won,
the black candidates won, and when the Republicans won, the black
candidates lost. Justice White suggested that
[i]f this is the proper view of this case, the failure of the ghetto to
have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as
a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting power of ghetto residents may have been "canthis seems a mere
celled out" as the District Court held, but
14 9
euphemism for political defeat at the polls.
Thus, thought Justice White, the district court's holding provided no
judicially manageable basis for distinguishing prohibited debasement
of an insular minority's voting strength from "the more general proposition that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in
legislative halls."' 50 The Court believed that affirmance of the district
court's reasoning would require that any geographically concentrated
group-Democrats, Republicans, union members, university communities, religious or ethnic groups-be entitled to its own "safe" singlemember districts. '5
But if Justice White's majority opinion exposed the weakness of
the district court's logic, it did not chart a more acceptable course. The
opinion did not imply, for example, that the Court would have found a
denial of equal protection in the Marion County multimember district
had the record demonstrated consistent racial bloc voting and the failure of either major party to slate black candidates. Justice White
named a number of additional evidentiary factors, absent in Whitcomb,
that might or might not be considered necessary to establish a fourteenth amendment violation: blacks' inability to register and vote, to
join and participate in the political party of their choice, or to command legislative response to their particularized needs. 5 2 The standards for proving minority vote dilution were left undefined, and the
strength of the Court's commitment to assuring that the rule of Reynolds would not become one white person, one vote, remained
uncertain.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id at
Id at
Id at
Id at
Id at
Id
Id. at

148-49, 164.
150 n.30.
134 n.ll, 150-53.
153.
156.
149-50, 155.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

White v. Regester 153 was the first case in which the Court held a
multimember district to be unconstitutional. In its unanimous decision, the Court appeared to affirm unequivocally its commitment to the
minority vote dilution implications of the Reynolds v. Sims rule. But
while it affirmed the district court's judgment 154 rejecting part of a
Texas House of Representatives reapportionment plan proposing atlarge voting in Dallas and Bexar (San Antonio) counties, the Court
once again avoided systematic analysis of the minority vote dilution
phenomenon and thus did not articulate uniform, manageable standards for determining when dilution violates the equal protection
clause.
Indeed, the meaning of the Court's unanimity in the White v.
Regester ruling against the two Texas multimember districts is unclear. 15 5 The Court's opinion largely recapitulated the district court's
factual findings 156 and cryptically announced that the Court was not
inclined to overturn them. 57 The litany of earlier Supreme Court
bouts with multimember districts was recited, 5 8 but no attempt was
made to explain why the record demonstrated an equal protection violation when that in Whitcomb v. Chavis did not. The Court merely
repeated the conclusion of Whitcomb that the burden of proof was on
the plaintiffs to produce evidence that the "political processes leading
to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by
the group in question. .... -159 No attempt was made to distill from
the cited precedents any evidentiary standards for proving "that multimember districts [were] being used invidiously to cancel out or mini60
mize the voting strength of racial groups."'
The trial court's findings of fact selected for inclusion in the
Supreme Court's opinion in White v. Regester are difficult to catalogue.
There was a history of de jure discrimination against black voters in
153. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
154. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 727, 733 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
155. Part I of White v. Regester dealt with the jurisdiction of the three-judge district
court. 412 U.S. at 759-61. Part II, in which five members joined Justice White's opinion,

held that the lower court had relied improperly on the demanding rule of Kirkpatrick when
considering whether a 10% variance among the Texas House districts met constitutional
requirements. Id at 761-64. In Part III and Part IV, the Court unanimously upheld the

judgment against at-large voting in Dallas and Bexar (San Antonio) Counties. Id at 765-70.
156. See 343 F. Supp. at 724-34.
157. 412 U.S. at 769-70.
158. Id. at 765-66.
159. Id at 766 (citations omitted).
160. Id at 765.
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Texas,16 1 and Mexican-Americans had been subjected to invidious discrimination in education, employment, economics, health and politics. 1 62 The record showed that only two blacks had been elected to the
House from Dallas County and five Mexican-Americans from Bexar

County since Reconstruction.

63

The Court did not say, however,

whether minority candidates had been defeated by racially polarized

voting. In Dallas a powerful, white-dominated Democratic Party organization had ignored blacks' political concerns and had used racial
campaign tactics to defeat candidates supported by the black commu-

nity,' 64 but no mention was made of any similar activities in San
Antonio. 165 Cultural and language barriers had resulted in depressed

Mexican-American voter registration in Bexar County,

66 but

no men-

tion was made of the black registration rate in Dallas. The Court did
find that requirements that candidates run for numbered places and

win by a majority of the total vote, "neither in themselves improper nor
...
167
invidious, enhanced the opportunity for racial discrimination.
No priority was attached to any of these facts; instead, the Court

merely approved the district court's conclusion of unconstitutionality
based on the "totality of the circumstances,"'168 and credited the trial

judges with a "special vantage point" from which they could make "an
districts
intensely local appraisal" of the racial impact of multimember169
"in light of past and present reality, political and otherwise."'
Following White v. Regester, the lower federal courts, particularly
those in the Fifth Circuit, faced a growing number of challenges by
blacks to multimember district plans. 70 The proliferation of these

cases, which usually contested county and municipal election schemes,
161. Id at 766.
162. Id at 768.
163. Id at 766, 768.
164. Id at 766-67.
165. The district court had found that there was no formal candidate slating process
used by Bexar County's Democratic Party. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. at 731. The
Supreme Court did note the trial court's finding "that the Bexar County legislative delegation in the House was insufficiently responsive to Mexican-American interests." 412 U.S. at
769.
166. 412 U.S. at 768.
167. Id. at 766.
168. Id at 769.
169. Id at 769-70.
170. See, e.g., Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded,
425 U.S. 947 (1976); Bradas v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 508 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1975);
Moore v. Le Flore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 502 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1974). See
generaly Bonapfel, Minority Challengesto At-large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 GA.
L. REv.353 (1976).
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probably was due more to the pervasiveness of the problem than to any
perceived clarity of the Supreme Court's mandate. The leading case in
this group was Zimmer v. McKeithen,'17 1 which in 1973 addressed the
at-large election of the police jury, which is a county commission, and
the school board in a small, rural Louisiana parish. In Zimmer, the en
banc Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attempted to do what the
Supreme Court had avoided: to provide trial courts with evidentiary
norms for deciding racial vote dilution cases. The principles of Zimmer
v. McKeithen, in fact, did guide the federal courts until City ofMobile v.
Bolden was decided in 1980.172
The Zimmer majority rejected the district court's reasoning that an
at-large apportionment plan by definition could not dilute the voting
73
strength of blacks because it provided a zero population deviation.
In defining the concept of fair representation, the circuit court recognized two essential elements. First, the one-person, one-vote standard
must be met as nearly as possible. 174 Second, "assuming substantial
equality, the scheme must not operate to minimize or cancel out the
voting strength of racial elements of the voting population." 175 A districting plan that met population equality requirements still could be
constitutionally challenged as racially discriminatory if there were
proof either that there was a racially motivated gerrymander or that the
plan would operate to dilute black voting strength. 176 The court declined to consider evidence of a racial purpose behind the at-large
scheme, because it found that the apportionment was constitutionally
infirm in its operation. 17 7 As the Fifth Circuit read Whitcomb v. Chavis
171.

486 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), afd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School

Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (affirmed "without approval of the constitutional views
expressed by the Court of Appeals." Id at 638.).
172.

"After Bolden, Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit wrote that Zimmer embodied a

jurisprudence produced by ten years of struggle and compromise between judges of varying
political and jurisprudential backgrounds. . . [A] majority ofjustices of the United States
Supreme Court in City ofMobile v. Bolden have rejected the Zimmer test, simultaneously

casting aside the ten years of thought, experience and struggle embodied within it. At this
point, mine is not to make reply, mine is not to reason why." Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640
F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
173.

485 F.2d at 1301-03.

174. Id. at 1303.
175. Id.
176. Id at 1304.
177. The court avoided the intent question because, at that time, Supreme Court case
law cast doubt on whether a reapportionment plan could be struck down "solely because of
the racial motivations of those who fashioned it." Id at 1304 n.16 (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971)). Indeed, the en banc Fifth Circuit interpreted the leading
gerrymander decision, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), as having "focused on
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and White v. Regester, the Supreme Court had been concerned with the
districting plan's operation. 178 From these two cases the Zimmer court

compiled "a panoply of factors, any number of which may contribute
to the existence of dilution."' 179 The court catalogued four "primary"
factors and four "enhancing" factors:
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of
slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying their preference
for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past
discrimination in general precludes their effective participation in the
election system, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a
showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for
at-large candidates running from particular geographical
subdistricts. 80
Over the next seven years, the so-called Zimmer factors were used practically to the exclusion of all other evidentiary criteria to govern the
outcomes of scores of at-large dilution cases. 18'
On direct appeal, Zimmer was affirmed by the Supreme Court on
the narrow ground that a judicially ordered reapportionment must
adopt single-member districts, unless extraordinary justifications existed for another type of plan. 8 2 The Court expressly reserved approval of the Fifth Circuit's constitutional theory of dilution. 8 3 Later
cases signalled the Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the Zimmer
approach and with the decision in White v. Regester underlying it. In
Wise v. Lipscomb,18 4 three other justices joined a concurring statement
by Justice Rehnquist that labelled the Zimmer analysis an "amorphous
the actual effect of the legislation being challenged, and not the reason why the legislation
was enacted." Id; accordKendrick v. Walder, 427 F.2d 44, 47 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975).
178. 485 F.2d at 1305.
179. Id
180. Id (footnotes omitted). In setting out these standards for proving unconstitutional
dilution, the court emphatically disavowed any intention that they be used to require mere
proportional representation: "Clearly, it is not enough to prove a mere disparity between
the number of minority residents and the number of minority representatives." Id (footnote
omitted).
181. See, e.g., Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the court declined
to consider whether a change to at-large elections in Albany, Georgia, in 1947 was an invidiously motivated response to federal court disapproval of the white primary; instead, it remanded the case to the district court for reevaluation of the evidence under the Zimmer
standards. For comprehensive summaries of the reported racial vote dilution cases, see
Bonapfel, supra note 170, at 353; Bickerstaff, ReapportionmentBy State Legislatures: .4Guide
for the 1980":, 34 Sw. L.J. 607, 647-49 nn.326-33 (1980).
182. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 434 U.S. 636 (1976).
183. Id at 638.
184. 437 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1978).
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theory." Washington v. Davis 85 andArlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp. 186 established an apparently comprehen-

sive requirement that plaintiffs prove a discriminatory purpose in equal
protection cases, without discussing the impact of such a rule on apportionment cases. Further, dialogue among the Justices on related issues
88
in Beer v. UnitedStates117 and UnitedJewish Organizationsv. Carey,1
strongly hinted at movement toward an intent requirement in dilution
cases. Finally, City ofMobile v. Bolden squarely presented to the Court
the question of intent.
City of Mobile v. Bolden: The Continuing Search
for Manageable Standards

In City ofMobile v. Bolden, 8 9 the justices confronted the lingering
problem of adjudicating at-large vote dilution cases caused by the lack
of clearly enunciated standards, but no five justices could agree on a
solution. The Bolden Court did reject, by a 5 to 4 vote, the Zimmer v.
McKeithen analysis as a satisfactory formula for detecting unconstitutional vote dilution,' 90 but the Court did not fill the vacuum left by
Zimmer's demise. Justice White correctly noted that the Bolden deciThe
sion "[left] the courts below adrift on uncharted seas ... ."1
Justices' divergent views of the at-large voting issue and the profoundly
different theories proposed in post-Bolden circuit court decisions192 un185. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
186. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
187. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
188. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
189. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
190. The Stewart plurality and Justice Stevens rejected Zimmer, id at 90, but for significantly different reasons. Justices White, id at 101-03, and Marshall, id at 122, on the other
hand, approved of the Fifth Circuit's Zimmer approach, and Justices Blackmun, id at 80-8 1,
and Brennan, id at 64, appeared to agree. But see Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1373
(5th Cir. 1981).
191. 446 U.S. at 103.
192. Compare Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d at 1373 (Bolden does not foreclose reliance
solely on Zimmer factors to infer intent), with McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d at
1247 n.16 ("Zimmer v. McKeithen has been invalidated by Bo/den and any conclusion based
solely on Zimmer factors would be erroneous"). Compare Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d at
1373-74 (Supreme Court concluded implicitly in Bolden that proof of unresponsiveness is
necessary for prima facie case of dilution), with McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d at
1248 (responsiveness now irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry). Compare United States v.
Uvalde Consolidated Independent School Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 552 n.7, 554 (5th Cir. 1980)
(majority of Court in Bolden believes purposeful dilution violates § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act or the fifteenth amendment), with McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d at 1243 n.9
(adopting plurality view in Bolden that vote dilution does not violate either § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act or the fifteenth amendment).
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derscore Bolden's failure to provide definitive answers.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion 193 endorsed invidious purpose
as the constitutional standard for at-large vote dilution. Using the evi195
94
dentiary guides set out in Washington v. Davis,1 Arlington Heights,
and PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney,19 6 Justice Stewart concluded
that "[a] plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was 'conceived or
operated as [a] purposeful [device] to further racial discrimination'
.
,,197 This conclusion required the plurality to distinguish multimember district dilution problems from the genre of vote dilution conis not
demned by Reynolds v. Sims; proof of invidious purpose
98
necessary to establish a one-person, one-vote violation.
Justice Stewart began making this distinction by limiting the application of Reynolds to mathematically demonstrable population malapportionments. 9 9 Consequently, in Justice Stewart's view, every atlarge system by definition perfectly satisfies the one-person, one-vote
principle, and no citizen within it can complain that his or her vote is
"diluted" in the Reynolds sense. 2°° Second, Justice Stewart coupled his
disposition of the Reynolds precedents with a narrow reading of the
fifteenth amendment. The amendment is completely satisfied, he
wrote, when the right to register and to vote is not formally restricted. 20 ' This reasoning enabled Justice Stewart to remove racial
vote dilution claims from the category of fifteenth amendment cases,
and to decide them instead under the rubric of equal protection. He
was then able to apply the standard of proof for equal protection attacks on facially neutral laws established by Washington v. Davis and
20 2
Arlington Heights: proof of invidious intent.
Justice Stevens disagreed with the Bolden plurality's selection of
an Arlington Heights intent standard for at-large dilution cases. In his
view, reference to the subjective intent of lawmakers would lead the
courts into a different kind of political thicket and would promote endless litigation concerning existing multimember districts. 20 3 Justice Ste193. Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist.
194. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
195. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
196. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
197. 446 U.S. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149).
198. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 579-80.
199. 446 U.S. at 78.
200. Id
201. Id at 65.
202. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
203. 446 U.S. at 92-93.
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vens proposed an even higher standard of proof that would have
required a showing that the apportionment plan was entirely motivated
by the desire to curtail the strength of a political minority and had no
20 4
other rational justification.
To distinguish Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny, Justice Stevens
named two different categories of vote dilution, one that requires strict
20 5
constitutional scrutiny of voting practices and one that does not.
The first category involves practices such as poll taxes or literacy tests
which restrict the individual's access to the ballot; the second category
concerns practices that, in his view, affect the political strength of discrete groups without inhibiting any individual's right to vote.20 6 According to Justice Stevens, population malapportionments interfere
with individual voting rights and thus fall into the strict scrutiny category, but at-large dilution cases concern only group rights and thus fall
20 7
into the second category.
While not explicitly adopting the plurality's intent standard, 20 8
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, stood by the "totality of circumstances" dilution standard, which he had authored in Whitcomb v.
Chavis and White v. Regester and which he found satisfactorily stated
in Zimmer v. McKeithen.209 Justice White considered the White-Zimmer criteria to be entirely consistent with the equal protection intent
210
requirement of Washington v. Davis, which he also had authored.
He defended the manageability of the White-Zimmer analysis, accusing the Stewart plurality of "viewing each of the factors. . . in isolation, and ignoring . . . the totality of circumstances .... ,21
204. Id at 90-91. For this argument, Justice Stevens drew on his dissenting opinion in
Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 446 F.2d 830, 848-52 (7th Cir. 1972), written when he
was a member of the Seventh Circuit.
205. 446 U.S. at 83-84.
206. Id at 83.
207.

Id at 83-84. See supra notes 10-11. In other words, Justice Stevens viewed the at-

large problem as simply another gerrymander case, indistinguishable from claims that
equal-sized district boundaries had been drawn purposefully to fragment the voting strength
of a political group. Recalling Justice Frankfurter's warning about the difficulty of devising
judicially manageable standards to govern intensely political apportionment decisions, id at
93 n. 15, he urged a rule of deference to legislative bodies that would acknowledge the consti-

tutionality of legislative use of racial and other group-based considerations in the apportionment process, so long as invidious discrimination was not obviously the legislators' sole
concern. Under this standard, racial groups would have no greater claim on judicial protection than would any religious, ethnic, economic, or political group. Id at 86.
208.

Later, in Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982), Justice White explained that his

Bolden opinion "agreed with the standard of proof recognized by the plurality." Id at 3277.
209.
210.
211.

446 U.S. at 101.
Id. at 101-03.
Id at 103.
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Justice Marshall, dissenting, rejected the intent requirement alto-

gether and insisted that at-large dilution and population malapportionment were only different manifestations of the same Reynolds violation;
the discriminatory effect standard of proof, therefore, was equally applicable to both.212 Justice Marshall endorsed the White v. Regester

test,213 which called for "intensely local appraisal" by the trial court of

evidence proving effective vote dilution. 214 Justice Marshall also embellished the White v. Regester principles with his own concise defini-

tion of impermissible vote dilution: "Unconstitutional vote dilution
occurs only when a discrete political minority whose voting strength is

diminished by a districting scheme proves that historical and social factors render it largely incapable of effectively utilizing alternative avenues of influencing public policy." 21 5 In response, Justice Stewart's
socioplurality opinion attacked this definition as consisting of "gauzy
no constitutional basis. 216

logical considerations [that] have

The Bolden opinions of Justices Stewart and Stevens regarded the

equal population guarantee of majority control as a constitutional right
more fundamental and more deserving of strict judicial enforcement
than the right to be free from racial vote diminution, the right explicitly
guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment, from which the one-person,

one-vote rule had been derived. 217 But it seems clear that they arrived
at this result "in spite of' rather than "because of" its historical and
constitutional inversion of values. 218 Both Justices seemed heavily,
perhaps entirely, influenced towards the Bolden intent requirement by

their inability to discern a judicially manageable standard in the White
v. Regester-Zimmer v. McKeithen dilution theories espoused by Justices White and Marshall, theories that undeniably tend toward
amorphousness.
212. Id at 116-17.
213. Id at 135 n.33.
214. Id (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 769).
215. Id at 111 n.7.
216. Id at 75 n.22. Ironically, commentators had criticized Justice Stewart's view of a
proper constitutional standard of majority rule after Reynolds for "hurl[ing] the Court back
into the thicket of non-justiciable issues" by requiring in every case "a detailed evaluation of
the politics of a state." See Auerbach, supra note 79, at 61.
217. The hands-off policy proposed by Justice Stevens was substantially the same as the
rationality standard that Justice Stewart had once persistently advocated in population malapportionment cases; now, in Bolden, Justice Stewart accepted mathematical equality as a
fundamental right. Justice Stewart had previously conceded this much of the Reynolds doctrine when he wrote in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 416 (1977): "The Equal Protection
Clause requires that legislative districts be of nearly equal population, so that each person's
vote may be given equal weight in the election of representatives."
218. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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Post-Bolden Developments: The Jffie-Zimmer Standard Rehabilitated
The decline of Zimmer v. McKeithen proved to be short-lived. In
Rogers v. Lodge, 2 19 the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's reliance on
the Zimmer factors to find racially discriminatory intent in the maintenance of an at-large election scheme in Burke County, Georgia. Justice
White's majority opinion, joined by five other Justices, did not answer
the contention of the dissenters that the facts in Rogers could not be
distinguished from those found insufficient to prove intent in Bolden.220
Instead, the opinion distinguished the two cases, first, because of the
trial court's acknowledgement in Rogers that purposeful discrimination
is the "ultimate issue" and, second, because the district judge was
aware that the Zimmer factors were not the exclusive indicia of such a
purpose.2 2' Consequently, even though the district court largely relied
on the Zimmer analysis, its finding of invidious intent was not clearly
erroneous and thus survived appellate review under the standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.222 It appears, therefore, that Rogers v. Lodge restored the White-Zimmer standard for constitutional
challenges of election systems that dilute the voting strength of racial
minorities. Now, however, the trial judge must conduct his or her "intensely local appraisal" of the "totality of circumstances" and then, instead of resting with a finding that the racial minority is denied equal
access to the political process, must pronounce a conclusion of pur223
poseful discrimination in order to avoid reversible error.
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the basis
of his conclusion that the evidence in Rogers was no different in kind
from that found insufficient to prove invidious intent in Bolden 224 Justice Stevens also dissented, extending the reasoning of his Bolden dissent. He reiterated and elaborated the argument that a subjective
intent approach was not "an acceptable, judicially-manageable standard for adjudicating cases of this kind. '2 25 Stevens still subscribed to
a rationality test, explaining that he would consider any electoral structure to be irrational and invalid if its only demonstrable justification
219.
220.
221.
222.

102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
Id at 3281-82 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id at 3280-81.
Id at 3278-79 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982)). Rule 52

provides in relevant part: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous
223.

Compare Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3280-81, with White v. Regester, 412 U.S.

at 765.
224.
225.

102 S. Ct. at 3282.
Id. at 3284.

September 1982]

VOTING RIGHTS

was "to assist a dominant party to maintain its political power." 226 He
persisted in the view that racial minorities should not be afforded "special protection" not available to any other political groups. 27 However, Justice Stevens seemed to soften this stance to the extent of
making racial discrimination "presumptively irrational," requiring
states to come forward "to identify legitimate local policies that might
justify" election system features with "an adverse impact on the minority's opportunity to participate in the political process. ' 228 His vote for
reversal in Rogers apparently was based on his belief that the racial
discrimination clearly demonstrated in Burke County's election scheme
could be cured by eliminating the majority-vote 229 and numberedpost 230 requirements, obviating the need to assess the at-large appor23 1
tionment itself.
Rogers was handed down only a few days after the President
signed into law the Voting Rights Amendment of 1982,232 which
amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to codify the While-Zimmer standard for racial vote dilution cases. 233 The amendment was
"designed to restore the legal standard that governed discrimination
cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden. ' 234 Congress,
226. Id at 3288.
227. Id at 3293.
228. Id at 3288.
229. Majority-vote provisions require candidates to obtain a majority of the votes cast in
order to win elections, thus eliminating the possibility of the top vote-getters being elected
with only a plurality of the votes cast.
230. Numbered posts or place requirements force each candidate to designate which of
the seats he or she is seeking on the representative board, commission or council. When
used in conjunction with a majority-vote requirement, they force runoffs, or head-to-head
contests, between the top two vote-getters for each seat, thus assuring that the full force of a
majority group's vote will not be dissipated.
23 1. Id at 3288 & n.22.
232. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). As amended, § 2(b) provides: "A violation of subsection
(a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the state or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the [s]tate or political subdivision is
one 'circumstance' which may be considered, provided that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." Id; see SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING RIGHTS ACT
EXTENSION, S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 27-28 n. 113 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].

234.

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 233, at 15.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

however, has labelled the White-Zimmer analysis a "results" test.235
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, "[t]he intent test focuses
on the wrong question and places an unacceptable burden upon plain'236
tiffs in voting discrimination cases.
In apparent disagreement, a clear majority of the Supreme Court
now has approved the aspect of the Bolden plurality's opinion that subjected attacks on multimember district election schemes to the invidious intent requirement "generally applicable to Equal Protection
Clause cases."' 237 It is difficult, however, to distinguish the Rogers "intent" test from the "results" test of the Voting Rights Act. However it
is characterized, it appears that White-Zimmer is the law of the land.
Toward a Constitutionally Adequate and Judicially Manageable
Standard of At-Large Vote Dilution
In spite of the political dangers perceived by the Court in articulating a judicially manageable standard of at-large racial vote dilution,
the Supreme Court is subject to a constitutional and historical imperative to develop such a standard. The standard must be commensurate
with, not subordinate to, the fundamental equal protection right to
population equality. As Bolden and Rogers demonstrate, none of the
analyses advanced thus far by members of the Court adequately meets
this criterion. The definition of multimember district vote dilution proposed in this Article is offered as a constitutionally adequate standard.
The constitutional rules for protecting racial minorities in the apportionment process cannot be written on a clean slate. The history of
race relations in the United States, the adoption of the Civil War
amendments to the Constitution, and the Supreme Court's full acceptance of Reynolds v. Sims must constrain judicial inclinations to erect
from scratch theories of minority representation that might appeal to
notions of doctrinal purity.238 In particular, the Court ought not coun235. Id at 2.
236. Id at 16. Nevertheless, when proceeding under the amended statute, plaintiffs may
choose to prove either discriminatory intent, using an Arlington Heights approach, or discriminatory results, using the White-Zimmer standard. Id at 27 & n.18.
237. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3275.
238. Similar legal, historical or social constraints have nearly always colored scholarly
visions of political equality. As Ronald Rogowski stated: "Two things are worth noting:
that divergent understandings of representation have rarely been embraced by the same
persons at the same time; and that people have usually been able to defend their respective
senses of the word, not just as 'primitives' of idiosyncratic grammars, but by reference to
circumstance and necessity." Rogowski, Representation in Political Theory and in Law, 91
ETHICS 395, 396 (1981). The particular place of racial minorities in the Constitution and
history of the United States must be such a reference point for the Supreme Court.
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tenance use of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to assure elec-

toral majorities a constitutional advantage over a racial minority.
Although many approaches to an analysis of minority representation
are theoretically credible,2 3 9 this Article proposes that the final test of
these theories should be not only whether they are judicially managea-

ble, politically fair, and consistent with democratic ideals, but whether
they can be reconciled with the existing constitutional record.
239. See, e.g., Symposium on the Theory and Practiceof Representation, 91 ETHICS 353,
486 (1981). All the contributors and commentators in the symposium appear to agree with
Jonathan Still that "political equality is not a single concept, but a group of distinct (though
related) criteria which have not previously been adequately distinguished." Still, Political
Equalityand Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375, 377 (1981). After warning that it is only one
of many aspects of political equality (e.g., economic, sociological, and psychological), Still
focuses on the "structural aspect" and identifies six progressively more stringent criteria of
political equality:
1. Universal equal suffrage: Everyone is allowed to vote, and everyone gets the same
number of votes. Id at 378.
2. Equal shares: Each voter has the same "share" in the election, defined as what that
voter voted on divided by the number of voters who voted on it. Id
3. Equal probabilities: Each voter has the same statistical probability of casting a vote
which decides the election. Id at 380.
4. Anonymity: The result of the election is the same under all possible distributions of
the voters among the positions in the structure of the election system. Id at 382.
5. Majority rule: An alternative favored by a majority of the voters will be chosen by
the election system. Id at 383.
6. Proportional group representation: Each group of voters receives the same proportion of the seats in the legislative body as the number of voters in the group is of the total
electorate. Id at 384.
These criteria, however, offer only "a framework for a more sophisticated analysis of
the concept of political equality . . . ." Id at 385. Applied to the real world, they fail
adequately to distinguish the differences between the election of a single representative and
the election of a multirepresentative legislature, and they presume that all voters are equally
likely to select one election alternative over the other, when in fact voters are members of
factions with predictable predispositions on the issues. Grofman, Fairand EqualRepresentation, 91 ETHIcs 477, 481 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Grofman, Representation];Rogowski,
supra note 238, at 402, 408. Consequently, for example, according to Still's criteria, even
equally populated single-member districts will not satisfy the criteria of equal probability,
anonymity, and proportional representation except in the special case where voters are not
distinguished by election predispositions. Grofman, Representation, supra, at 477-78. But
at-large elections with a majority vote requirement will satisfy all the Still criteria except
one, proportional representation, even in the familiar case where a bloc-voting majority faction is able to capture all the seats, denying the minority voters equally weighted or effective
voting strength and depriving them of fair or equal representation. Still, supra, at 384, 38889; see also Rogowski, supra note 238, at 403, 412. Thus Still's structural analysis of representation underscores the unique danger to racial minorities posed by at-large voting, which
alone satisfies all the theoretical criteria of representational equality except for the one criterion that takes into account the real world of racial and political factions.
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Recognizing a Fundamental Constitutional Right of Racial Minorities to Be
Free from At-Large Vote Dilution

A constitutionally unacceptable flaw in the standards for proving
at-large vote dilution advanced by Justices Stewart and Stevens in City
ofMobile v. Bolden and by Justice White in Rogers v. Lodge is that the
racial minority's right of judicial protection is subordinated to the majority's right of electoral rule. Not only are blacks and other racial minorities required to carry a heavier burden of proof than are majority
groups in order to safeguard for themselves an "equally effective voice"
in legislative apportionments, but the standards offered by Justices
Stewart and Stevens actually presume that, when majority voting
strength is safeguarded, the minority has no further right to complain.
In this respect, their theories are, as a matter of fact 240 and as a matter
of constitutional priority, antithetical to the basic rationale of Reynolds
v. Sims and the Reapportionment Cases.
The Court was sharply divided in the Reapportionment Cases
over the existence within the fourteenth amendment of a fundamental
right to an equally effective vote,24 1 a right discovered only by interpolation of the fifteenth amendment's explicit condemnation of abridging
voting rights on the basis of race or color.2 4 2 It is not necessary, however, to challenge the validity of the Reynolds principles in order to
accept the proposition that, in terms of constitutional priorities, racially
based abridgement of voting strength is no less objectionable than population-based vote dilution. Whether it is the voting strength of blacks
240.
241.

See supra note 239.
Justice Harlan, in the Reapportionment Cases, demonstrated that the framers of

the fourteenth amendment did not intend for it to interfere with the states' plenary power to
regulate the franchise, Auerbach, supra note 79, at 74, and no member of the Court has
argued to the contrary. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 274-75 (1970), Justices Bren-

nan, White, and Marshall concluded that some supporters of the fourteenth amendment did
intend for it to regulate the allocation of political power, but that they "left to future interpreters of their amendment the task of resolving in accordance with future vision and future
needs the issues that they left unresolved." Nor has any member of the Court disagreed with

the conclusion that the "end of discrimination against the Negro was the compelling motive
of the Civil War Amendments." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 266, 285-86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); accordRegents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.);

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967);
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).

242. Reliance on the fifteenth amendment to infer additional, nonracially based rights of
voting equality in the fourteenth amendment first appears in Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963): "The concept of political equality in the voting
booth contained in the Fifteenth Amendment extends to all phases of state elections. ...

(A]nd, as previously noted, there is no indication in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the
State." Id at 380 (citation omitted).
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that has been devalued or that of some other racial, ethnic, or cultural

minority, such dilution is contrary to the primary purpose of the fourteenth amendment in both its original and modem contexts. 2 43 Statesupported racial discrimination is the first concern of this constitutional
value system because it is "illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society." 244 Therefore, judi-

cial rules of enforcement that lessen the ability of racial minorities to
avoid submergence of their electoral strength by a racial majority undermine basic constitutional principles.
The Court has always recognized that the one-person, one-vote

rule could in some situations provide new opportunities for legally
sanctioned racial vote dilution, in particular by encouraging the use of
multimember districts or by inviting lawmakers to ignore traditional
safeguards against gerrymandering, such as political boundaries, in the
pursuit of "pure" population equality 45 . The irony of Reynolds and its
progeny is that the dangers of racial discrimination inherent within the
rule were most often marshalled by the conservative members of the
Court to support their arguments against the liberals' increasingly strict
standards of mathematical voting equality. 246 As Justice Blackmun
243. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 255, 292-96 (1978) (Powell, J.).
244. Id at 295 n.35 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
245. Multimember districts can perfectly accomplish mathematical voting equality
within each district and at the same time can maximize the opportunity for cancelling out
the voting power of minority groups. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 157-60; Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. at 437; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. at
750-51 (Stewart, J., dissenting). It can be demonstrated that at-large voting satisfies five of
the six criteria of political equality, including majority rule. See supra note 239. But majority rule is fundamentally incompatible with the sixth criterion of equality, proportional representation. Grofinan, Representation, supra note 239, at 478-79 & nn.4-5. Thus, at-large
elections allow the same majority to control all the seats selected. This result may not be
politically unfair if the electorate actually is totally unpredictable, with each voter equally
likely to select any particular candidate. But in reality, most electorates are made up of
voters who have known predispositions about candidates or issues, so that the at-large election permits a faction or bloc holding 51% of the votes to control all the seats while the other
49% are totally unrepresented. Rogowski, supra note 238, at 403, 412.
In most cases, at-large elections eliminate the need of hostile white majorities to employ
more obvious discriminatory contrivances, such as gerrymandered ward boundaries. However, even if single-member districts were used, insistence on strict census equality could
enhance the ability of race-conscious legislators to gerrymander blacks into political impotence. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 429 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 113-21. Justice Brennan apparently has chosen
to adhere strictly to the classic liberal theory of equal representation, which presumes that
"each person is an atom, able best to judge for himself and unpredictable in either his tastes
or his alignments with others." Rogowski, supra iote 238, at 402. Because of this idealistic
predicate of the liberal theory, "factions have been its bane." Id at 403. Robert Dixon was
a persistent critic of the Brennan position: "There is a sort of vague impression in many
quarters that equality in census numbers alone produces basic fairness, that legislative dis-
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pointed out, "Equal apportionment is a majoritarian principle, but racial representation is a question of minority rights. I think the Court's
opinion does not sufficiently focus upon the potential dissonance between the one-person, one-vote ideal and a goal of fair representation
for minorities.

' 24 7

The four-Justice Bolden plurality accepted the Reynolds precedent
insofar as it established a fundamental fourteenth amendment right of
equally populated legislative districts. Census data demonstrating that
such districts are effectively malapportioned compel close judicial scrutiny of the apportionment plan. But, according to the plurality, evidence that the plan has the effect of minimizing or cancelling out a
racial minority's voting strength alone will not establish a prima facie
constitutional violation; 248 rather, an invidious legislative purpose behind the apportionment scheme also must be proven. 249 In his swing
vote for reversal in Bolden, Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality's
trict lines can be politically neutral, that something called nonpartisanship can be built into
the districting process. My own experience tells me that although I may find nonpartisanship in heaven, in the real world, and especially in academia, there are no nonpartisans,
although there may be noncombatants." Dixon, FairCriteriaandProceduresforEstablishing
Legislative Districts, 9 POL'Y STUD. J. 839, 840 (1981).
247. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 427 (1977) (citation omitted) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Most scholarly supporters of the majoritarian principle established by Reynolds have
urged that special judicial care be taken to ensure that racial and political minorities are not
submerged entirely. See, e.g., Backstrom, Robins & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering- An
Exploratory Measure of Partisan GerrymanderingApplied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1121, 1134-38 (1978); Dixon, supra note 246, at 841; Grofman, Aiternatives,supra note 10, at
885. But some of the early one-person, one-vote apologists went too far in suggesting that
population equality by itself would sufficiently guard minorities: "I agree with Professor
Sidney Hook that the 'dictatorship of the majority' is a 'bugaboo which haunts the books of
political theorists but has never been found in the flesh in modem history.'" Auerbach,
supra note 79, at 49 (quoting S. HOOK, THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM 66 (1962)). According to Professor Auerbach: "The multiplicity and variety of interest groups in the United
States, and the countervailing power they possess, keep any one interest, or combination of
interests, from dominating our society ...
"In short, the 'monolithic' majority feared by Mr. Justice Stewart does not exist; the
majority is but a coalition of minorities which must act in a moderate, broadly representative fashion to preserve itself....
"Underlying our system of election and representation and political party organization,
then, is a social system of checks and balances which is a sufficient guarantee against the
'tyranny of the majority."' Auerbach, supra note 79, at 52-53 (footnote omitted). How anyone writing in 1964 could so ignore the South's century-old institutions of white supremacy
and single-party politics is beyond understanding. Even today, political scientists reaffirm
that race is the single most powerful factor in Southern politics. E.g., N. BARTLEY, THE
SOUTH AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 191 (1975); D. STRONG, ALABAMA: TRANSITION AND ALIENATION, CHANGING POLITICS OF THE SOUTH 427 (W. Havard ed. 1972).

248. 446 U.S. at 66; accord Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3276.
249. 446 U.S. at 66.
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distinction between a Reynolds violation and at-large racial vote dilution.25° He then went further, demanding strictly objective evidence
that the at-large plan has no other rational motive than racial
2 51
discrimination.
The expulsion of minority voting rights from the constitutional penumbra of Reynolds v. Sims works a special injustice on racial minorities in the United States. Historically, majority rule in this country has
meant white rule.2 52 As the Civil War opened, even free blacks were
253
denied suffrage in an overwhelming majority of the northern states.
Both before and after adoption of the fifteenth amendment, at-large
election plans were employed throughout the country to cancel out the
voting strength of blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities. 254 The
so-called Progressive Reform Movement at the turn of the twentieth
century prominently featured at-large voting as a device for politically
neutralizing readily mobilized racial, ethnic, and economic minority
groups."5 Many of the state laws that today prescribe at-large elec250. Id at 83-84.
251. Id at 90.
252. See generally W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968).
253.

C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760-

1860, at 277-78 (1960). Only five New England states and New York permitted blacks to
vote. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 255-56 (1970) (opinion of Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall) (citing Van Alstyne, The FourteenthAmendment, the Right' to Vote, and the
Understandingof the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33, 70).
254. E.g., Holli, Social and StructuralRefIorm, in THE CITY Boss IN AMERICA 215-24
(Callow ed. 1976); T. WILLIAMS, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1865, at 164
(1959). The hearings following remand from the Supreme Court in Bolden v. City ofMobile
revealed that Mobile used ward elections from 1818 through the Civil War and changed to
exclusive use of at-large voting in 1870, the first city elections in which blacks were permitted to vote. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1074 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
255. The movement aimed to put in office the "best" citizens from all-white business
and professional classes. B. RICE, PROGRESSIVE CITIES: THE COMMISSION GOVERNMENT
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1901-1920, at xvi, 4-18, 26-29, 34-51, 60-61 (1977); see also C.
BEARD, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT (1912); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN
THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1918 ch. 4 (1968); Hays, The Politics ofReform in Municipal Government in the ProgressiveEra, 55 PAC. Nw. Q. 157-69 (1964); Weinstein, OrganizedBusiness
and the City CommissionerandManagement Movements, 28 J. So. HIsT. 166-82 (1962). The
antidemocratic, minority-diluting features of the city commission form of government have
moved one jurist to suggest that its enabling legislation in Illinois may be unconstitutional
on its face. Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 51-58 (7th Cir. 1975) (Pell, J., dissenting). In
the South this movement achieved the nearly total disfranchisement of blacks. S. HACKNEY,
POPULISM TO PROGRESSIVISM IN ALABAMA ch. 8 (1969); J. KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS 45-47, 130-38 (1974); M. MCMILLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN ALABAMA 1798-1901: A STUDY IN POLITICS, THE NEGRO, AND SECTIONALISM ch. xiv

(1955). In 1909, Frederick Bomberg of Mobile, former state senator, congressman, and state
bar association president, wrote: "You know that it was the effort to obliterate the negro
vote in the past which led to all of the methods of fraud perpetrated at the ballot boxes by
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tions for municipalities, county commissions, and school boards in the
South were enacted during the Progressive Period, 25 6 when blacks
could not vote and thus could not participate in the apportionment decisions. 257 Until the mid-twentieth century, white voters in Southern
states like Florida and Alabama frequently enjoyed single-member districts in the white-only Democratic primary elections for local government while the general elections, the only ones in which the few black
2 58
voters could participate, were conducted at large.
sworn election officers in order to defeat the negro vote, which demoralized the growing
generation of young men, and to cure which was the avowed purpose of the sections in the
present state constitution regulating the franchise.
"We have always, as you know, falsely pretended that our main purpose was to exclude
the ignorant vote, when, in fact, we were trying to exclude, not the ignorant vote, but the
negro vote." Mobile Register, July 25, 1909 (quoted in Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F.
Supp. at 1065-66).
256. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 59; Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663
F.2d 659, 661 (5th Cir. 1981); McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1244 (5th Cir.
1981); McGill v. Gadsden County Comm'n, 535 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1975); Kendrick v.
Walder, 527 F.2d at 51 (Pell, J., dissenting).
257. Adding insult to injury, the federal courts have considered the fact of prior black
disfranchisement as creating "race-proof' circumstances and have presumed, therefore, that
Southern lawmakers could not have been motivated by racial discrimination when they
switched at this time to at-large election systems for local governments. Bolden v. City of
Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 397 (S.D. Ala. 1976), a 9'd 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rep'dand
remandedon othergrounds, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (citing McGill v. Gadsden County Comm'n,
535 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1976)); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remandedon othergrounds, 425 U.S. 947 (1976); Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893, 896-97
(5th Cir. 1974). But see Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1075 (S.D. Ala. 1982)
(new evidence presented at trial on remand convinced court that "invidious racial reasons
played a substantial and significant part" in the 1911 adoption of at-large commission government for Mobile). In written testimony during hearings on extension of the Voting
Rights Act, historian J. Morgan Kousser showed how the intent-effect dichotomy relied on
in City ofAMobile v. Bolden was a piece of historical dej& vu. The Undermining of the First
Reconstruction: Lessonsfor the Second- Hearingson H.R 3112 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and ConstitutionalRights ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 30-31
(1981) (statement of J. Morgan Kousser) [hereinafter cited as Kousser, House Hearings]. In
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), the Court upheld the conviction of a black
man, even though he proved that the state had used a jury selection designed to exclude
Negroes. The Court held that the man had failed to prove the requisite discriminatory effect
as well. In a case that followed, black plaintiffs showed that the Alabama Constitution of
1901 had both the purpose and effect of disfranchising Negroes. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S.
475 (1903). But then the Court refused to order relief on the ground that either ordering the
state to register Giles or striking down the suffrage provisions would embroil the judiciary in
political questions best left for Congress to solve. Six months after Giles, Congress closed
the circle by rejecting the congressional seating contest brought by disfranchised black Mississippians, ruling that such charges of racial discrimination were best left to the courts.
"The Alphonse-Gaston routine of Congress and the Supreme Court ...left blacks with no
rights that the white men of the national government were bound to protect." Kousser,
House Hearings, supra, at 31 (footnote omitted).
258. See, e.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d at 1244 n.10. Remand proceed-
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Moreover, during the post-Civil War years of black disfranchisement in the South, malapportionment assured that the rural counties
controlled the all-white state legislatures. 259 Blacks, the population
majority in these districts, effectively were prevented from voting26 o until passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a year after Reynolds ruled that
such malapportioned districts were unconstitutional. The ironic result
of these events was that while the right to vote was being secured to
racial minorities, the voting strength of blacks in Alabama was being
reduced by the one-person, one-vote rule.26 ' The historical backdrop
of Reynolds v. Sims, therefore, substantially increases the constitutional
imperative that the judiciary afford protection against dilution of minority voting strength commensurate with the protection now afforded
to majority rule. This protection is not provided by any of the standards proposed to date by members of the Supreme Court.
Assessing the Bolden Opinions
If a proper standard for determining at-large racial vote dilution
must be faithful to constitutional priorities and offer reasonable judicial
manageability, then none of the standards offered in the several City of
Mobile v. Bolden opinions succeeds.
Justice Stewart cast the representational interests of blacks into the
Washington v. Davis dust bin of rights that have no fundamental, independent claim to strict judicial protection and, therefore, must be imings have revealed that municipal elections for Mobile, Alabama, were conducted in this
fashion from 1872 to 1907. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. at 1064.
259. See R. CORTNER, supra note 2, at 160-62.
260. Comment,4/abama'sUnrepresentativeLegislature, 14 ALA. L. REV. 403, 406 (1962)
(citing FARMER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN ALABAMA 24 (1949); M. MCMILLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA 1798-1901, at 283-309, 360-70 (1955).

261. If there had been no post-1901 reapportionment in Alabama, according to the 1980
census data, the Black Belt counties with outright black population majorities would today
control 19 house seats, 18% of the 106 total, and 7 senate seats, 20% of the 35 total. Compare
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION &
HOUSING FOR ALABAMA 4-14 (advance rep.), with ALA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 202-203 (1901).
By equal population standards, however, these counties are entitled to only 5% of the seats.
Actually, as a result of the 1982 elections, there are 17 black members of the Alabama House
of Representatives and 3 black senators. Only three of these black legislators represent a
rural Black Belt county; the others were elected from majority black urban districts in Birmingham, Mobile, Tuscaloosa and Montgomery. The total population of Alabama is 25.6%
black. Of course, the 1901 apportionment had been designed to favor the conservative
stronghold in the Black Belt, at a time when white supremacists successfully excluded blacks
from the political process. R. CORTNER, supra note 2, at 160-61. See generally Brief Opposing Motion to Dismiss at 2, Burton v. Hobbie, 103 S. Ct. 286 (1982).
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paired purposefully before a constitutional violation occurs. 262 In
arriving at this conclusion, he had to make a similar evaluation of the
right of geographic population majorities not to have their voting
strength diluted. If population malapportionment offended no fundamental constitutional concern, then even overpopulated districts would
not be constitutionally objectionable unless they were totally irrational2 63 or an invidious legislative purpose to discriminate against voters in those districts could be shown. 264 If, on the other hand, one
person, one vote was a fundamental constitutional right, and proof of
more than a mere debasement effect of the voting power of minorities
was to be required, then at-large racial vote dilution had to be distinguished from dilution resulting from population imbalances. 265 In
choosing the latter alternative, Justice Stewart abandoned the positions
he had maintained since Reynolds concerning both the constitutional
266
necessity of population equality and the realities of dilution.
Justice Stewart seemed unwilling to include at-large vote dilution
within the proscription of Reynolds v. Sims because it was "difficult to
perceive how [its] implications. . . could rationally be cabined. '267 But
the invidious intent standard he adopted does not promise to solve the
2 68
it
manageability problem. In fact, as Justice Stevens pointed out,
262. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66-67 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
at 240).
263. Irrationality would be a tough standard for reapportionment plaintiffs to meet. At
best, only the "crazy quilts" would be vulnerable. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. at 754-59 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 587-88
(Clark, J., concurring).
264. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 112-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265. Id
266. See supra text accompanying notes 61-89. In earlier decisions, Justice Stewart had
insisted that the fourteenth amendment conferred no voting rights and was not intended to
restrict state apportionment decisions, but in Bolden he accepted the Reynolds principle that
the equal protection clause guarantees to each voter an equally effective voice. Compare
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. at 745-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting) with
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 77-78.
While in the earlier cases Justice Stewart had argued that equal voting strength could
not be measured solely by the "sixth-grade arithmetic" of population equality, and that such
a measurement ought to take into account the complex realities involved in accommodating
group interests, in Bolden he concluded that the Reynolds requirement of an equally
weighted, fully effective vote is completely satisfied by population equality. Racial minorities fenced out of a "unitary" at-large district, therefore, cannot claim that their vote has
been diluted in the Reynolds sense. Compare Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377
U.S. at 749, and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 509 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting),
with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 77-78.
267. 446 U.S. at 77-78 n.25.
268. Id at 92-93. In Rogers Y. Lodge, Justice Stevens developed at length his objections
to the use of a subjective intent standard in dilution cases. 102 S. Ct. at 3286-92.
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may make the judicial task even more uncertain. Most apportionment
decisions are made with fully realized political intentions; 269 thus, to
argue that any resulting disadvantage to racial groups is accidental is to
ignore reality.270 An evidentiary standard for detecting discriminatory
intent that allows courts honestly to identify and condemn every legislative decision that purposefully advantages one racial group at the expense of another in the apportionment process would sweep broadly
indeed.27t Justice Stevens even argued that "the facts of political life
would deny legislatures the right to perform the districting function." 272 On the other hand, as Justice Marshall pointed out, if the intent standard requires federal courts to accept legislators'
apportionment choices "so long as they sufficiently mask their motives
through the use of subtlety and illusion," 273 or so long as they can point
to some nonracial justification for the districting scheme, 274 it will be
impossible for disadvantaged blacks to prevail. Between these two extremes are countless other problems presented by an intent standard
269. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 749; Dixon, Fair Criteriaand Proceduresfor
EstablishingLegislative Districts,9 Pot'y STUD. J. 839 (1981).
270. 446 U.S. at 91; accordGaffniey v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 753 ("[I]t is most unlikely
that the political impact of [a reapportionment] plan would remain undiscovered by the time
it was proposed or adopted, in which event the results would be both known and, if not
changed, intended.").
271. "A rule that would invalidate all governmental action motivated by racial, ethnic
or political considerations is too broad. Moreover, in my opinion the Court is incorrect in
assuming that the intent of elected officials is invidious when they are motivated by a desire
to retain control of the local political machinery. For such an intent is surely characteristic
of politicians throughout the country." 102 S.Ct. at 3292 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 91.
273. Id at 135.
274. "The principal concern here is... that a judge's reluctance to challenge the purity
of other officials' motives may cause her to fail to recognize valid claims of racial discrimination even when the motives for governmental action are highly suspect. Because an individual's behavior results from the interaction of a multitude of motives, and because racial
attitudes often operate at the margin of consciousness, in any given case there almost certainly will be an opportunity for a governmental official to argue that his action was
prompted by racially neutral considerations. When that argument is made, should we not
expect the judge to give the officials the benefit of the moral doubt? When the governmental
action is the product of a group decision, will not that tendency toward generosity be heightened?" Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3290 n.28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Karst, The
Costs ofMotive-CenteredInquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1164-65 (1978)).
Justice Stevens seems to agree with Professor Karst and would restrict judicial inquiry
into the purpose of legislative action to "customary indicia of legislative intent. . . . The
formal proceedings of the legislature and its committees, the effect of the measure as evidenced by its text, the historical setting in which it was enacted, and the public acts and
deeds of its sponsors and opponents. . . ." Id (quoting Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d
830, 856 (7th Cir. 1972)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens apparently acknowledges Justice
Marshall's point that placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove an invidious racial purpose in
the face of such legislative history would be an impossible task, and, instead, he would shift
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that threaten legislative independence, judicial manageability, and the

constitutional guarantee of an equally effective voice for racial
275

minorities.
Not only does an intent standard leave unresolved the problem of
judicial manageability, it arguably aggravates the problem. No other
member of the Court has rebutted Justice Stevens' convincing argument that the "unseemly" 276 case-by-case examination of lawmakers'
motives places the federal judiciary not just in a "political thicket" but
in "a vast wonderland of judicial review of political activity," 277 and
that it "cannot possibly satisfy the requirement of impartial administra-

tion of the law.

.... 278

The White-Zimmer "access to the political process" standard espoused by Justices White and Marshall 279 cannot claim much greater
hope of judicial manageability. At the very least, it probably deserves
the "amorphous" label some members of the Court bestowed on it.280
the burden to the state defendants to show in the legislative record sufficiently persuasive
nondiscriminatory reasons to justify a law that disadvantages minority citizens. Id
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, on the other hand, would place on plaintiffs the burden
of affirmatively demonstrating invidious intent strictly on the basis of Justice Stevens' "objective factors." 102 S. Ct. at 3283 (Powell, J., dissenting). They do not answer Justice Marshall's charge that this standard would immunize all but racially explicit laws.
275. For example, invidious racial motives may be mixed with legitimate nonracial apportionment considerations. Justice Stewart's Bolden opinion would condemn legislation
that was racially motivated "at least in part." 446 U.S. at 71-72 n.17. Justice Stevens, on the
other hand, "do[es] not believe otherwise legitimate political choices can be invalidated simply because an irrational or invidious purpose played some part in the decisionmaking process." Id at 92. Thus, the courts and legislators are left to wonder, if racial discrimination
need not be the exclusive purpose, how much relative weight must it carry? Must all, or a
majority, of the lawmakers share the invidious motive? Must the most influential decisionmakers be identified and their motives scrutinized? What if the legislators innocently
rubber-stamp racially intended proposals of local officials? See McMillan v. Escambia
County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1247 (5th Cir. 1981), appeal andpetitionforcert. dismissed, 453 U.S.
946 (1981). Similarly, Bolden does not indicate how much deference must be accorded incourt denials of invidious motives by decisionmakers. See MAeMillan, 638 F.2d at 1245, on
reh'g, 688 F.2d 960, 964 (5th Cir. 1982). Whether discriminatory intent must be detected in
a discrete legislative decision, or whether the court may consider the cumulative purpose of
a series of laws enacted over the years is unclear. Bolden offers no guidance for evaluating
an apportionment plan that was originally adopted for the purpose of diluting black voting
strength but has acquired legitimate, nonracial justifications in intervening years. These
questions only begin the tangled inquiry into the meaning of an intent standard of unconstitutional dilution.
276. 102 S.Ct. at 3290 n.28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Karst, supra note 274, at
1164-65).
277. Id at 3292.
278. Id at 3289.
279. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 95, 135 n.3.
280. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 549 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J.).
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Most of the cases concluding under the White-Zimmer guidelines that
at-large schemes were constitutional cannot be distinguished analyti-

cally from those reaching a contrary result on any basis other than the
varying personal political views of the trial and appellate judges who
decided them.28 ' Some capriciousness is an inherent risk of a standard

local appraisal" 282 of the "totality of circumcalling for an "intensely
28 3
stances" of each case.

Justice Marshall embellished the White-Zimmer standard by call-

ing for proof of "historical and social factors" that make it difficult for
the "political minority" to influence public policy by means outside the
at-large election process. By doing so, to some extent he might have
introduced more uncertainty and hence even less judicial manageability.284 The quality and quantity of proof sufficient to demonstrate that
281.

See, e.g., cases cited in Bickerstaff, supra note 181, at 647 n.326. Contra SENATE

REPORT, supra note 233, at 32 (some 23 reported vote-dilution cases prior to Bolden applied

WAfte-Zimmer and provided "an extensive, reliable and reassuring track record").
282. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 769-70.
dissenting). The Senate Judiciary Committee expressed
283. 446 U.S. at 103 (White, J.,
the unjustifiably sanguine view that the White-Zimmer test "is a well defined standard [that]
...
SENATE REPORT, supra note 233, at 16.
will provide ample guidance to federal courts.
The factor of governmental unresponsiveness to minority interests has been particularly susceptible to virtually standardless treatment. See Carpeneti, supra note 53, at 684 ("an unworkable test"). Some courts have discounted its importance where the evidence was weak,
while other judges have demanded proof of unresponsiveness so strict as to establish clear
violations of federal civil rights laws governing municipal services. Compare Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1306 n.26 (at-large elections declared unconstitutional in spite of
total absence of proof of unresponsiveness), and Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626
(M.D. Ala. 1978) (unresponsiveness determined in spite of "mixed" evidence showing racial
equality in most municipal services), with David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir.
1977) (district court findings of racially discriminatory "dilapidated housing, poor enforcement of the city building codes, and despite recent efforts by the city to upgrade the streets in
the area, inferior streets" remanded as insufficient to establish unresponsiveness), and Dove
v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152, 1155 (8th Cir. 1976) (substantial disparities between the services
provided black and white residents do not prove unresponsiveness where a "large portion"
of city's revenue sharing funds spent in black community). See also cases cited in Bickerstaff, supra note 181, at 647-48 n.327.
Both the Court and Congress now have repudiated the suggestion that proof of unresponsiveness is an "essential" element of the Ifllite-Zimmer standard. Federal courts still
are directed, however, to weigh such evidence as one of several "important" elements of the
constitutional test, Rogers, 102 S. Ct. at 3280 n.9, and under the statutory standard as one of
the "[a]dditional factors that in some cases have had probative value." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 233, at 29.
284. Justice Marshall's insistence on proof that the minority group is shut off from nonjudicial sources of relief-like the "access to the political process" theory itself-is reminiscent of the arguments made by urban interests in Baker . Carr that federal courts should
compel population reapportionment where all political and legislative avenues were sealed
off. But if racial elements of the electorate could demonstrate that a particular multimember
district scheme impaired their fundamental constitutional right to a fully effective vote in the
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racial minorities are unable to influence elected officials through "a variety of other political, social and economic groups" 28 5 or are unable to
form effective out-of-office factions to "serve as watchdogs on the performance of the government ' 28 6 are sure to vary widely from case to
case and from court to court.
The Rogers majority held that the White-Zimmer analysis is simply a particular application of the equal protection intent standard, a
conclusion that is at least debatable in view of vigorous disagreement
by both Congress and the Rogers dissenters. In Rogers, Justice White
did not identify which state actors were guilty of improper motivation,287 unless his reference to the discretion Burke County's state legislators have over purely local affairs 288 means that they necessarily are
the culprits. Nor did he attempt to respond to the contentions of Justices Stevens and Marshall that a motivation analysis should be irrelevant when violation of the constitutionally protected right to an equally
effective vote, not just the denial of a "constitutionally gratuitous benefit," 28 9 is at issue. As the Senate Judiciary Committee said, the intent
test focuses on the wrong question. An intent requirement is particularly objectionable when population majorities are not burdened with
this added element of proof in order to obtain judicial relief. Whether
it is denominated "intent" or "results," the White-Zimmer standard
cannot claim judicial manageability adequate to serve the fundamental
voting rights it seeks to analyze.
Of all the Bolden opinions, Justice Stevens' alone explored the policy concerns underlying the search for a manageable standard of dilution. But he simply readopted, sometimes verbatim, his lengthier
analysis of gerrymandering in Cousins v. City of Chicago.290 By applyReynolds sense, proving lack of access to nonjudicial remedies should be as unnecessary for
them as it is for population majorities. As one commentator said about Whitcomb v. Chavis
and its "access" standard, it "caus[ed] one to wonder whether this was a vote dilution case or
" Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equ~ipopulous Gerryana 'white primary' case ..
dering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Questfor Fairand Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 277, 307.

285. 446 U.S. at 11 n.7.
286. Id
287. 102 S. Ct. at 3281 (Powell, J., dissenting), 3290 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288. Id at 3280.
289. Id. at 3288 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bolden, 446 U.S. at 121 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
290. 466 F.2d 830, 847 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Coushis was the classic
gerrymander case, involving single-member districts which had been reapportioned by incumbent council members to preserve their old wards at the expense of racial and political
groups who were out of power. A majority of the Seventh Circuit panel ruled that there was
sufficient evidence of inculpatory remarks by the aldermen drawing boundary lines to re-
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ing to Bolden his Cousins rationale for approving allegedly gerrymandered city council districts in Chicago, Justice Stevens would make
it literally impossible to challenge any at-large election system on constitutional grounds.
Dissenting from the Seventh Circuit opinion, Cousins v. City of
Chicago, then-Judge Stevens considered seven possible judicial standards for addressing what he had denominated group-based gerrymander claims. 291 What Justice Stevens finally settled on as "a workable
guideline for judicial management of gerrymandering litigation '292 was
the old equal protection rationality standard: plaintiffs must show that
wholly irrelevant to the achievethe districting plan "rests on grounds
'293
ment of a valid state objective.
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, Justice Stevens transposed his Cousins
analysis of the gerrymander problem without modification to litigation
attacking at-large districting.294 No at-large apportionment scheme,
however, can fail the rationality test. Every at-large plan can display
legitimate objectives such as those advanced by the city of Mobile: perfect mathematical equality, encouragement of citywide perspectives on
the part of elected officials, and discouragement of ward-heeling. Jusmand the case for a new trial on the issue of racial gerrymandering. Id. at 843-44. But it
rejected the claims of nonracially grouped, politically unaligned "independent voters," citing a line of cases holding that allegations of nonracial, purely political gerrymandering
were nonjusticiable. Id at 845. Dissenting, Judge Stevens thought that the rights of nonracial political groups should be identical to those of racial minorities in the apportionment
process. Id at 848. He rejected the "easy distinction" between racial and political gerrymandering afforded by the language of the fifteenth amendment, concluding that the fourteenth amendment gave the same protection to all politically cohesive groups. Id at 848-50.
But he recognized that a standard of proof available to every group had to be drawn narrowly if legislative bodies were to be left free to carry out the legitimately political reapportionment function. So Judge Stevens distinguished gerrymander cases from those which he
perceived as challenging practices that diminished an individual's voting strength and which
required a compelling state justification. Id at 851. In his view, claims that equally populated districts nevertheless diluted someone's voting strength did not concern individual
rights but group rights, and the voting rights of a group were not entitled to the same strict
protection as those of the individual. Id at 851-53, 855.
291. Id at 853-58. He found six of the standards unacceptable: (1) no judicially manageable standard is available, so gerrymander issues are entirely nonjusticiable, id at 853;
(2) if mathematical equality is achieved, then courts may inquire no further into vote dilution, id at 853-54; (3) to prevail, the complaining group must demonstrate that invidious
discrimination is the sole purpose of the districting plan, id at 854; (4) conversely, any taint
of invidious intent invalidates the plan, id at 854-56; (5) discriminatory subjective motives
on the part of the plan's sponsors would invalidate it, id at 856-57; and (6) any plan which
denied a group its proportionate share of population majority districts would violate their
constitutional rights, id at 857-58.
292. Id at 859.
293. Id (quoting Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970)).
294. 446 U.S. at 86-87.
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tice Stevens' description in Cousins of a single-member district plan
that would survive a gerrymander challenge illustrates the futility of
attacking at-large schemes under his theory:
If the basic plan is designed to follow historic political boundaries, natural barriers, or reflects a consistent endeavor to achieve
compactness to the extent allowed by the requirements of contiguity,
and, of course, if the equal population requirement295is met, rarely if
ever could a plan be attacked as wholly irrational.
Every districting plan that relies completely on citywide or countywide
voting follows precisely the political and natural boundaries of the jurisdiction and the districts are always perfectly compact, contiguous,
296
and equally populated.
Perhaps because he realized that every at-large apportionment
would satisfy the test of rationality, Justice Stevens apparently attempted to modify his position in Rogers. There he suggested that
Burke County's election system might be irrational, not because it required all candidates to run at large, but because the numbered places,
majority-vote requirement, and lack of residency subdistricts seemed to
him to have no other purpose than "to assist a dominant party to maintain its political power," 297 a policy which Justice Stevens summarily
concluded was "arbitrary and capricious. ' 298 He would leave it open
for state defendants "to identify legitimate local policies that might justify the use of such rules, ' 299 but his skepticism that such "local" justifications could exist seems clear. With these features eliminated, Stevens
is convinced, "a well-organized minority [could] elect one or two candidates to the county board."' 3°° But even if this prediction is plausible, it
'30 1
is not, as Justice Stevens insists, "apparent.
More to the point, it is not at all clear why the justification for
numbered places, majority-vote requirements, and no residency requirements would be less legitimate or less rational than that support295. 466 F.2d at 859.
296. Such districting plans cannot contain patterns "explicable only by reference to a
purpose to segregate or to disadvantage a definable group." Id.
297. 102 S. Ct. at 3288 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298. Id
299. Id
300. Id at 3288 n.22.
301. Id A plurality-win possibility would, indeed, make the election of minority-favored candidates likely. But there is no guarantee of such an opportunity as a practical
matter. Each case depends on the unique circumstances of local political dynamics, as the
White-Zimmer line of cases recognized. The uncertainty of minority influence is such that
the Court has established a firm rule favoring single-member districts instead of tinkering
with the at-large rules when a judicial remedy is called for. E.g., East Carroll Parish School
Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
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ing at-large voting itself: increasing the likelihood that all seats will be
filled by candidates who have "countywide perspectives" and who are

unbeholden to any "ward-heelers;" i.e., assuring that all the winners
are those who are most acceptable to the entire county electorate. The
features Justice Stevens would strike down as arbitrary and capricious
merely "enhance" the objectives of at-large plans generally, and the
Court has expressly held that they are "neither in themselves improper

nor irrational." 30 2 Assisting a dominant party to maintain its political
power is a natural tendency of all at-large schemes and a necessary
corollary of their confessed objectives. Nor does it seem to be any

more odious a policy than that of preserving incumbencies, a reapportionment policy that the Court has found not to be unconstitutional per
se.

303

Serious questions can also be raised about Justice Stevens' reliance
on individual and group voting rights as a justification for applying
strict scrutiny to mathematical deviations from equality and a more
deferential standard to gerrymandered districts. 304 Although the Court
has never defined explicitly what constitutes equality of voting rights
within the constitutional context,30 5 its repeated insistence on the provision of an "equally weighted" and "equally effective" vote necessarily
implies that each voter must have an equal opportunity to affect the
election result.3°6 This requires more than the provision of mere equal
voting "shares," that is, the same mathematical number of voters per
representative.3 07 Reference also must be made to the manner in which
voters are grouped, that is, to the relative size of the districts and to the
302. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766.
303. Eg., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 753; Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 112 n.5
(1971); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. at 89 n.16. If Justice Stevens is attempting to discover
a manageable constitutional standard for at-large systems that serves his commitment to the
principle that "in a representative democracy, meaningful participation by minority groups
in the electoral process is essential.. . "1102 S. Ct. at 3288 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting), he
may be unwilling to accept any allegedly rational justification for a scheme that systematically excludes the choices of a racial minority. In this event, his view of the proper constitutional approach may not be much different from the standard proposed in this Article. See
in7fa text accompanying notes 319-20.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
305. Political scientists and theorists consistently have criticized the Court's failure to
analyze carefully the meaning of such grand generalities as political equality, equally
weighted votes, equally effective votes, equal representation, vote dilution and minimization
of voting strength. See, ag., Dixon, The Warren Court Crusadeforthe Holy Grailof 'One
Man-One Vote,' 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 219, 227; Grofman, Representation,supra note 239, at
480 n.8; Mansbridge, Living Wth Conflict: Representationin the Theory ofAdversaryDemocracy, 91 ETHmcs 466, 470 (1981); Rogowski, supra note 238, at 375, 377, 388, 394.
306. Rogowski, supra note 238, at 419-20; see also Still, supra note 239, at 377-88.
307. Still, supra note 239, at 379-80. See supra note 239.
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voting propensities of other voters both within and without a particular

person's district. 30 8 From both theoretical and practical standpoints, an
individual's voting strength cannot be divorced from the voting
strength of the group in which he or she is placed by the election
309
structure.

Justice Stewart, who also would reserve strict judicial scrutiny for
dilution of individual voting rights and require stricter proof of the debasement of a group's voting strength, at least alluded to the logical
weakness of this distinction.
It is, of course, true that the right of a person to vote on an equal
basis with other voters draws much of its significance from the political association that its exercise reflects, but it is an altogether different matter to conclude that political groups themselves
have an
3 10
independent constitutional claim to representation.
Although Justice Stewart's observation is true, the phenomenon of racial vote dilution is offensive not because of any independent constitutional claim of the racial group, qua group, but because, in the same
respect that an overpopulated district undervalues the individual voting
rights of its residents, so are the individual voting rights of each member of the disadvantaged racial group diminished. To say that one circumstance injures personal or individual rights while the other injures
3
only group rights is analytically inaccurate. "1
If members of a cohesive racial group find themselves split into
voting minorities among several election districts, each member will
suffer dilution of his or her voting strength, and the distinction drawn
by Justices Stevens and Stewart between individual and group rights
cannot explain why he or she ought to be required to advance proof
that the apportionment-makers intended to accomplish this result. As
308. Still, supra note 239, at 380-83.
309. Rogowski, supra note 238, at 397.
310. 446 U.S. at 78 (footnote omitted).
311. Proponents of equipopulous territorial districting admit that it is simply another
manner of grouping the electorate. "The fact is that for purpose of representation, people
are grouped on the basis of where they live." Auerbach, supra note 79, at 37. Their claim
that territorial grouping is more likely to enhance "individual" voting power is based on the
tendency of geographic districts to cut across other political interest groupings and therebytheoretically, at least-to encourage individual voters to decide each election choice on its
merits rather than on the basis of their racial, economic, religious, social or other group
affiliations. Id at 38, 55-57. Therefore, the success of territorial districting as a protector of
individual voting rights critically depends on whether the electorate achieves substantial
nonpartisanship. If nonterritorial factionalism nevertheless controls election outcomes,
equally populated geographic districts are more likely to impair rather than to enhance individual voting equality if they are either designedly unconscious of or consciously unfair to
the operative group interests. See supra note 245.
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one theoretician commented, "The inequality here would be particularly invidious if the districts had been deliberately designed to bring

about this result; but even if it came about by accident, the inequality is
real (and substantial) nonetheless." 312 Both Justices Stewart and Stevens were unable to perceive how the strict scrutiny required in the
one-person, one-vote cases would produce anything less than a propor-

tional representation rule if adopted in at-large dilution cases. 313 Yet,
justifying a less demanding test for at-large plans on the basis of the
same individual versus group rights distinction that until Bolden had
been the underpinning for the dissents against the one-person, one-vote
rule has a resoundingly hollow ring.

The most obvious explanation for the miscarriage of Stevens'
Cousins rationale in the Bolden context is that he failed to observe that

at-large districting is not just another potential gerrymander. Rather, it
is a legislative decision not to redistrict at all, that is, not to engage in
the political process of apportioning seats to geographic areas but to
allow the same citywide or countywide majority to control all of the

seats. 314 Since no political districting choices are made, those choices
cannot possibly be made invidiously or irrationally. Meanwhile, under

the rational basis standard, the at-large scheme enjoys guaranteed acceptability. The rational basis standard may or may not be a workable,
constitutionally acceptable approach to claims that equally populated
districts have been drawn to carve up the voting strength of a protected

group, 315 but it will never work as a measure of at-large dilution.

312. Still,
supra note 239, at 382. Another political theoretician makes a similar point:
"The member whose ideal preferences can never affect outcomes cannot be distinguished
analytically from a nonmember. His condition is that of the slave or the traditionally dominated wife: In any conflict, it is the master's ideal preferences, or the husband's that prevail." Rogowski, supra note 238, at 398. Cf.McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239,
1249 (5th Cir. 1981) ("a slave with a benevolent master is nonetheless a slave").
313. 446 U.S. 78-79 (Stewart, J.), 86, n.6 (Stevens, J.).
314. "mhe choice of elections at large as opposed to elections by district, however unequal the districts, is a matter of sweeping political judgment having enormous political implications, the nature and reach of which are certainly beyond the informed understanding
of, and capacity for appraisal by, courts." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 328 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("The very essence
of districting is to produce a different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be
reached with elections at large. . . ."); see also Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 126 (1967)
concurring); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 621 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
(Douglas, J.,
315. The weight of lower court decisions addressing claims of racially gerrymandered
district boundaries favors a burden of proof similar to the Washington v. Davis-Arlington
Heights standard of legislative intent set out in the Bolden plurality opinion. See, e.g.,
Cousins v. City of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1972); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96,
105 (M.D. Ala. 1965). However, there are indications that the Supreme Court will look with
suspicion on fragmentation of racial voter concentrations that are not clearly justified by
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This analysis returns us to the unique conflict presented by the
impact on minority voting strength of the one-person, one-vote rule of
Reynolds P. Sims. As the Reapportionment Cases' dissenters strained
to show, the one-person, one-vote rule is one of several possible antidilution formulas, distinguishable from others primarily by the mathematical simplicity of its statement. Its elevation to the status of fundamental constitutional right may facilitate gerrymandering of other
sorts, as the Court has always acknowledged. 31 6 An at-large plan offers
majority-backed legislators an opportunity to avoid altogether the
political and judicial risks of having to share power with racial minorities in the apportionment process. 3 17 Furthermore, such a plan is unassailable from the standpoint of population equality. The Constitution,
however, requires that the explicitly protected beneficiaries of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments be provided fundamental and certain
protection from discrimination by at-large plans. The several proposals in City of Mobile v. Bolden and Rogers v. Lodge fall short of this
mark.
One Proposal for a Constitutional Standard of At-Large Vote Dilution
The history of Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny demonstrates that
attempts to formulate a single constitutional standard of vote dilution
that will succeed in every situation probably will fail. As analysis of
Justice Stevens' proposal to apply to at-large schemes the same standard of proof he used in a gerrymander situation shows, one is not
likely to discover a single formula for assuring equally effective voting
strength. 31 8 This Article proposes the following criteria for use in meaimportant state policies. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 422-28. It is not likely that the
question of an appropriate constitutional standard of gerrymandering will be settled until
the Supreme Court fully and carefully analyzes the concept of equal representation it claims
is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 305.
316. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79.
317. Scholars who argued against court attacks on partisan gerrymanders as constitutional problems have done so because of a conviction that political and social constraints
connected with decennial reapportionment would "make partisan districting an increasingly
risky enterprise." Auerbach, supra note 79, at 65 (footnote omitted).
318. Rogowski, supra note 238, at 396. As Robert Dixon stated: "'[O]ne man, one vote'
should be perceived as a symbol of an aspiration for firmness, for avoidance of complexity,
for intelligibility in our representational process-indeed, for a sense of meaningful membership in thepolis. These are legitimate aspirations, but there is no single, simple formula
for their accomplishment." R. DIxON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 268 (1968)
(quoted in Baker, An HistoricalTour Through the PoliticalThicket: Tracing the Steps of the
Laze Robert G. Dixon, Jr., 9 POL'Y STUD. J. 825, 831 (1981)). See Auerbach, supra note 79,
at 22 ("The principle of 'One Person, One Vote,' by itself, is confusing.").
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suring unconstitutional3 19 vote dilution caused by at-large election
plans, without demanding that they should constitute the exclusive
standard for at-large situations: An at-large election schemefor a state
or local multi-representativebody is unconstitutional when jurisdictionwide electionspermit a bloc-voting majority, over a substantialperiodof
time, consistently to defeat candidatespublicly identffted with the interests

ofandsupportedby apoliticallycohesive, geographicallyinsularracialor
ethnic minority group.

Any successful standard for analyzing an at-large system must detect the same kind of devalued voting strength that the one-person,
one-vote rule measures. The standard must also provide a principled

basis for judicial review and consistency of result in a variety of circumstances and in a variety of courts. At the same time, it must avoid
both outlawing multimember districting per se and becoming merely a
320
guarantee of proportional representation.
319. Other measures of unconstitutionality already recognized by federal courts should,
of course, continue to be available as well. See infra note 335. The standard suggested in
this Article, however, is one that could be applied in every situation, regardless of the
lawmakers' motives or of a particular state's history of de jure racial discrimination in the
exercise of the franchise.
In addition, Congress may elect to exercise its enforcement authority under § 2 of the
fifteenth amendment and § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to erect even stricter proscriptions against at-large schemes. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980);
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). See generally Derfner, supra
note 19. Indeed, a strong argument could be made that, consistent with the underlying purposes of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, Congress ought to outlaw at-large voting
and multimember districting entirely-at least on a temporary basis-in those jurisdictions
with an established recent history of de jure white supremacy. Accord Rogers v. Lodge, 102
S. Ct. at 3288 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The burden could then be placed on such jurisdictions tojustify reinstallment of at-large schemes by proof that the vestiges of official discrimination had been eliminated and that racial minorities would not suffer dilution of their
voting strength as a result. Instead of this more direct standard, the Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 adopted the White-Zinmmer test that is criticized in this Article. See supra text
accompanying notes 232-36.
320. Why proportional representation has gotten a black eye in the Supreme Court is
not altogether clear. Political scientists agree that the only way to assure every voter an
equally effective voice is to adopt one of the proportional representation electoral forms.
See Grofman, Representation,supranote 239, at 480; Rogowski, supra note 238, at 411, 429;
Still, supra note 239, at 384. But the Court has never hesitated to repudiate suggestions that
the Constitution demands proportional representation in state elections, nor has it thought
this pronouncement warranted much explanation. The earliest mention of it appears to be
in Justice Stewart's dissent in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth GeneralAssembly, where it deserved
only a footnote: "Students of the mechanics of voting systems tell us that if all that matters
is that votes count equally, the best vote counting electoral system is proportional representation in state-wide elections. It is just because electoral systems are intended to serve functions other than satisfying mathematical theories, however, that the system of proportional
representation has never been adopted." 377 U.S. at 750 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149, and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 765-
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Although Reynolds v. Sims used broad, majestic language to define
the constitutional entitlement, speaking in terms of "fair and effective

representation for all citizens," 32 the actual holdings of the Reapportionment Cases and their progeny have limited strict judicial scrutiny
to problems of geographic or territorial districting. 322 Only if substan-

tial inequality appears from the comparison of populations within district boundaries and their abilities to influence election outcomes will
the Court demand compelling justification by the state. All other forms
of underrepresentation have been left to legislative bodies as political
decisions, subject to challenge only on grounds of capriciousness and
3 23
invidious intent.
66, summarily announced that racial and ethnic groups could not prove constitutional violations solely by reference to underrepresentation in proportion to their population, but directly implied that such a showing would be sufficient if coupled with the additional proof
that they did not have equal access to the political processes leading to the election of legislators of their choice. See also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. at 157 & n. 16 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). But the Stewart plurality opinion in Bolden removed all qualifications from its
rejection of proportional representation as a constitutional standard: "The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation as an
imperative of political organization." 446 U.S. at 75-76.
Imperative or not, the Court has never suggested that the Constitution somehow disfavors proportional representation in state and local elections, and requiring such representation seems natural as an equitable remedy for constitutional violations. But, again without
much explanation, the Court has instructed federal courts to employ single-member districting whenever they must order their own malapportionment remedies. Connor v. Johnson,
402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971); accord East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). It would appear, as Robert Dixon suggests,
that the Court has adhered rigidly to the district election system as a judicial remedy "because we are used to it, and because it accomplishes certain other ideals, or at least beneficial
results. It accomplishes the ideal (or strongly tends to) of preserving a two-party system. A
two-party system operates to produce such coordinate goals as a clear governing majority,
governmental stability, and pin-pointing of governmental responsibility... . In short, proportional representation election systems yield more proportional representation than do
district systems, but sacrifice the coordinate goals of a governing majority, governmental
stability, and clear lines of responsibility." Dixon, supra note 269, at 841; see also Connor v.
Finch, 431 U.S. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The normal system of legislative apportionment in the United States is direct territorial representation by single-member districts."); Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927, 935 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1978).
321. 377 U.S. at 566.
322. Indeed, this was the basis for Justice Stewart's narrow construction of the Reynolds
principle, which, he claimed, prohibited only those election schemes in which "the votes of
persons in more populous districts carry less weight than do those of persons in smaller
districts." City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 78.
323. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 753-54. Again, the judicial inclination to
turn a blind eye to factors of equal representation other than equally populated districts does
not mean they are any less real or powerful. The most persistent and effective voice reminding the Court of this political reality was the late lawyer-political scientist, Robert G.
Dixon, Jr. See Baker, supra note 318. His last article reiterated the point: "The. . . key
fact is that whether or not non-population factors are expressly taken into account in shap-
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To be consistent with this policy of judicial restraint, a standard
for judging at-large vote dilution must be based not on a measure of
group proportionality but on a determination that the complained-of
underrepresentation is specifically attributable to, or proximately
caused by, the choice of an at-large system rather than single-member
districting. The operative question must be whether the inability of
members of an identifiable minority group to have their choices regiselection would be possible or permissible in a distered in an at-large
324
tricted system.
The problem with the at-large scheme arises with the emergence,
over a period of time, of a persistent pattern in which a politically cohesive district repeatedly finds its choices defeated by a citywide majority.
Such an unrelieved series of electoral results, if they occurred in districted elections, would violate the one-person, one-vote rule. The
problem is observed solely on the basis of voting patterns; there is no
need to inquire into the political stories behind the election returns in
order to discern a real debasement of the district's voting power, which
is the same kind of vote devaluation as was at issue in Reynolds.
More difficult to decide is what degree of dysfunctioning of an atlarge plan presents a constitutional problem. The fate of social, economic, and political groups traditionally has been left for resolution to
the political process without intervention by courts. The federal judiciary, however, having derived a fundamental right of majority rule from
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, is obligated to afford commensurate protection against minority vote dilution by at-large
big political districts they are inevitably ever-present and operative. They influence all election outcomes in all sets of districts. The key concept to grasp is that there are no 'neutral'
lines for legislative districts." Dixon, supra note 320, at 839.
324. For example, consider a hypothetical city in which residents on one side of the
railroad tracks make up a clearly identifiable working class district. Analysis of at-large
elections will show (a) whether any candidate was the clear choice of the workers, and
(b) whether, nonetheless, opposition from political forces outside the working class district
were powerful enough to defeat the workers' favorite. If it can be demonstrated that singlemember districts could not be drawn without the likelihood of at least one district having a
workers' majority, it can also be shown that the at-large election result clearly would be
contrary to the constitutionally required result had there been a districting election plan. If
not, then the use of at-large rather than district voting would be of no consequence, in the
Reynolds sense that an identifiable geographic population is entitled solely by the weight of
its ballots to select its own representative. Of course, this is precisely the difference that an
at-large scheme is designed to make. Perhaps next time the working class district will join
with other political interests to form a new majority coalition. Or perhaps the district will be
divided into new political factions and will no longer express a clear workers' choice. The
occasional at-large disadvantage suffered by the working class area, gauged by a districted
election standard, is counterbalanced by occasional winner-take-all victory or by shifting
political characteristics.
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schemes on the basis of race or ethnicity. Claims of racial vote dilution
resulting from at-large elections, unlike claims of racially gerrymandered single-member districts, necessarily force federal courts to
resolve a direct conflict between two constitutional criteria of fair representation: majority rule and nondiscrimination against racial
minorities.
Justice Stevens consistently has opposed the adoption of a constitutional rule of vote dilution that extends only to racial or ethnic
groups and not to other social, economic, or political factions. His dissenting opinion in Rogers eloquently defends his position.32 5 His policy concerns, even though they purport to express nothing more than a
personal view, have obvious merit. Perhaps he is right that the voting
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment should be expansive enough
to protect all types of political factions. Indeed, the White-Zimmer
analysis, criticized by Justice Stevens and this Article as less than adequately manageable, appears not to be limited to racial groups. 326 The
standard of at-large dilution proposed here easily could be extended to
all political groups as well. We do not contend that this or any other
workable judicial rule must be confined to the benefit of racial or ethnic
groups. Rather, we argue that, if the Court's reluctance to overextend
federal judicial involvement in state and local political affairs so warranted it, restriction of an at-large dilution rule to racial or ethnic minorities could be justified constitutionally. What Justice Stevens fails
to acknowledge is that the special protection of racial groups, which he
would consider valid as "a legislative choice rather than [as] a constitutional principle, ' 32 7 has already been made an explicit constitutional
choice by framers of the Civil War amendments. The obligation to
construct a constitutional jurisprudence that fully assures racial equality cannot, therefore, be avoided in the name of federal-state comity.
In the context of single-member district reapportionment, it may
be possible for the judiciary to abstain from interfering with local political competition and from affording racial minorities protection not
available to other political or social groups without abandoning completely the policy of the fifteenth amendment. If single-member district
boundaries must be drawn according to population, any bloc-voting
racial majority must bear the risk of being forced to share political
power with the racial minority, either because of the political constraints of reapportionment or because total emasculation of the minor325. 102 S. Ct. at 3293-94.
326. Id. at 3286, 3292 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. Id at 3294 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ity's strength would offend even a narrow, rational basis standard of
judicial review. At-large elections cannot be so treated, however, be-

cause they provide, under a rational basis standard, a no-risk exclusion
of minority choices by a sufficiently cohesive majority bloc. If the purpose of the fifteenth amendment is not to be sacrificed entirely to the
newfound fourteenth amendment guarantee of majority rule, at least in
the special case of at-large elections, the Court must adopt a less defer-

ential constitutional standard of racial vote dilution. On the basis of
existing precedent,

28

it would seem that the Court must acknowledge

that a constitutionally intolerable problem exists when an at-large
scheme consistently and systematically dilutes the329voting strength of a
geographically isolated racial or ethnic minority.
The proposed formula, therefore, satisfactorily detects in the atlarge scheme the same kind of vote devaluation for racial or ethnic
groups that the population equality rule discovers for any other geographic group in a districted plan. Minority voters are injured in a
constitutional sense by at-large elections only if the election returns
show that districted elections satisfying the one-person, one-vote rule
likely would have required a more favorable result. To demonstrate

this, the minority voters must be sufficiently concentrated and politically cohesive that a putative districting plan would result in districts in
which members of a racial minority would constitute a majority of the
voters, 330 whose clear electoral choices are in fact defeated by at-large
328. The majority opinion in Cousins v. City of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 845 (7th Cir.
1972), cites the long list of decisions that have rejected the constitutional claims of nonracial
political groups. Cf.United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (rejecting
claims by the Hasidic community in Brooklyn that redistricting violated their rights under
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments).
329. Accord Carpeneti, supra note 53, at 685. This middle ground between proportional
representation and total disregard of the effective submergence of all minority groups is thus
mapped out by clearly articulated constitutional priorities, producing the kind of "philosophical trade-off' that political scientists urge for judicial reconciliation of intractable theory and the real world: "My argument is not that we, or the Court, should pursue political
equality at any costs. Rather, as with so many other values, we should (1)try to be precise
about what political equality is and why we want it; (2) specify those situations in which it is
most important (when we want it most); (3) try to estimate its costs in particular situations;
and (4) try to construct, in a way consonant with the weight we give political equality and
other values, a pattern of philosophical trade-offs or 'indifference curves' which help make
us conscious of how much we value one good relative to another at different points." Mansbridge, Living with Conflict: Representation in Theory o/Adversary Democracy, 91 ETHcs
466, 470 (1981).
330. See Carpeneti, supra note 53, at 696-97. This is not to say that, under a districted
plan, blacks would be constitutionally entitled to have the boundaries drawn in a fashion
that guaranteed them a proportionate number of majority black districts. As was pointed
out in the discussion of Justice Stevens' Bolden opinion, see supra notes 98-99, constitutional
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voting. If minority voters' residences are substantially integrated
throughout the jurisdiction, the at-large district cannot be blamed for

the defeat of minority-supported candidates even if minorities vote as a
bloc for unsuccessful candidates. The constitutional standard thus

would only protect racial minority votes from diminution proximately
caused by the districting plan; it would not assure racial minorities pro33
portional representation. '
The proposed at-large dilution standard also is not so demanding
as to make at-large voting unconstitutional per se, a rule the Court has
steadfastly disavowed. 332 A plan would not be unconstitutional if the
defeats of minority-favored candidates were only episodic. A plan

could be found unconstitutional only upon a showing of a consistent,
scrutiny of gerrymandering claims may require a substantially more deferential standard of
proof if a de facto rule of proportional representation must be avoided.
Nor do we suggest that, to ascertain the requisite geographic contiguity of the racial
minority, it would be necessary to employ the kinds of computer-assisted mathematical
models that have been devised by political scientists to test the fairness of single-member
districts. See, e.g., Backstrom, Rolins & Eller,supra note 247; Engstrom, The Supreme Court
and Equpopulous Gerrymandering-.A Remaining Obstacle in the Questfor Fairand Effective
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L. Rv. 277. Rather, in the context of at-large voting, the
relevant question should be whether the minority population is so concentrated that, if districts were drawn pursuant to accepted nonracial criteria, there is a reasonable possibility
that at least one district would give the racial minority a voting majority. Mathematical
techniques certainly would answer the question, but rougher appraisals ought to suffice
when the inquiry is whether a bloc-voting majority should submit to the risks of singlemember districting.
331. The proposed standard also bears exclusively on the election of representative bodies consisting of two or more members. It thus gives explicitly the answer that should have
been implicitly obvious to questions about the meaning of minority vote dilution if applied
to public offices which necessarily must be chosen by all the voters in a jurisdiction, i.e.,
single-member positions. See, e.g., Still, supra note 295, at 385.
332. Compare Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. at 437-39, with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. at 66. The Court has taken this position in spite of the fact that, from a strictly mathematical standpoint, multimember districts provide their residents greater power to affect
election outcomes than do singie-member districts. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 144-46
& n.23 (citing Banzhaf, Multi-member Electoral Districts: Do They Violate the 'One Man,
One Vote'Princople?75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966)). It can also be shown that, where minorities
have a fixed percentage of voters in each district, a larger minority percentage is required in
multimember plurality bloc voting to avoid total exclusion of minority choices than if the
same bloc voting patterns occurred in single-member districts. Grofman, Alternatives, supra
note 10, at 881. But the Court has rejected purely "theoretical" objections to multimember
district schemes on the ground that they do not take into account the "real-life impact" of
"political or other factors which might affect the actual voting power of the residents, which
might include party affiliation, race, previous voting characteristics, [etc.]." Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. at 146. Nevertheless, these mathematically demonstrable inequities of
multimember districting make all the more inappropriate a constitutional presumption of
their validity, especially in the face of "real-life" facts showing how they effectively dilute
the voting strength of a racial minority.
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systematic pattern of a minority's choices being submerged by a blocvoting racial majority. If at-large schemes are to be permitted at all,
judicial review must tolerate occasional defeat of even a racial minority's choice, so long as the electoral history does not demonstrate that
such defeat generally is predictable. If election results over a period of
time reflect a genuine ability of the racial minority at times to prevail,
whether by coalition politics or some other means, the at-large scheme
33 3
would be constitutionally unobjectionable.
In terms of certainty and consistency, the proposed standard
promises to be nearly as manageable as the population equality rule. It
avoids the vagaries of evaluating legislative and political dynamics, the
subjects of both the Arlington Heights standard and the White-Zimmer
criteria. Instead, this standard focuses on voting patterns discernible
almost entirely in census or registered voter data and in election returns. 334 Ignoring sociological factors, such as the history and lingering
effects of official racial discrimination, the circumstances surrounding
adoption or retention of the at-large plan, and the responsiveness of
elected officials to minority interests, is justified for the same reason
these factors are irrelevant to the one-person, one-vote inquiry-they
simply are not necessary for detecting the constitutional offense. While
these factors and others like them may indicate that impermissible vote
dilution exists, 335 they are merely causes or symptoms of such dilution
and not the most direct and reliable means of measuring it.
By insisting on proof of some of these causes or symptoms, with
unspecified quality or quantity, the White-Zimmer standard both demands too much of vote dilution victims and promotes capricious results. 33 6 On the other hand, a showing of racial bloc voting and the
failure of black candidates, the "important evidence of purposeful exclusion" in Rogers,337 may indeed be too little to stand alone as proof
333. Predictability is what distinguishes vote dilution from the mere losing of elections
in the at-large context.
334. In this way, it also satisfies Justice Stevens' demand for reliance exclusively on
objective evidence.
335. Indeed, proof (albeit more difficult) either that the at-large statute was adopted or
has been retained for a racially invidious purpose or that a racial minority is unable to elect
any candidates at large as a direct result of prior de jure racial discrimination should afford
additional, independent bases for constitutionally required judicial relief. E.g., Kirksey v.
Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968
(1977); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
336. In particular, jurisdictions with histories of de jure racial discrimination will be
susceptible to unwarranted condemnation of at-large systems that in fact may not dilute
minority voting strength, while jurisdictions without histories of official discrimination will
likely survive challenges to at-large schemes that systematically exclude minority choices.
337. 102 S. Ct. at 3279.
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of unconstitutional dilution. In addition, the complainants should have
to demonstrate that the clear choices of minority voters were defeated
systematically by the racial majority voting as a bloc and that the minority is residentially concentrated enough to benefit from a geographical districting scheme.
Certainly, the proposed standard demands some exercise of judicial discretion. In evaluating elections in a particular locality, the court
must decide to what degree the minority group is geographically insular and politically cohesive, whether candidates are publicly identified
with and supported by minority interests, to what extent their defeat is
attributable to majority bloc voting, and whether the frequency and
duration of minority vote submergence are substantial. But these observations are not qualitatively more difficult to make than are those
associated with population malapportionment claims: what percentage
variance is substantial enough to make out a prima facie case, and what
state governmental interests are substantial enough to justify mathematical imbalances. Consideration of some of the more obvious questions about application of the proposed at-large dilution standard
illustrates its judicial manageability.
The ultimate criterion of geographic insularity is whether singlemember districting would produce any majority black districts. Whitcomb v. Chavis, White v. Regester, and City of Mobile v. Bolden each
presented a situation in which racial residential segregation was obvious; indeed, the potential availability of some districts with black or
Mexican-American majorities has been clear in virtually every reported
case challenging at-large elections. 33 8 Otherwise, a single-member district remedy would not have been sought in the first place. In other
counties and cities, however, the racial minority is small enough and
dispersed enough to prevent it from being a majority in any one
339
district.
338. See, e.g., cases cited in Bickerstaff, supra note 181, at 647-48 n.327.
339. Such was the case for Mexican-Americans in Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535
(1978). The court-ordered change to district elections in Dallas, in order to afford some
council seats for the larger black minority, purportedly reduced the political effectiveness of
Mexican-Americans, because, it was alleged, they were in a better position to influence atlarge elections. Id at 546 n.9; see also Lipscomb v. Wise, 551 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th Cir.
1977). The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's exclusive imposition of single-member districts and approved the city council's mixed plan of eight single-member districts and
three at-large seats, although on grounds ostensibly unrelated to the complaint of MexicanAmericans.
Under the at-large dilution standard proposed here, Dallas's Mexican-American community would be entitled neither to demand nor to oppose districted elections. Without the
possibility of at least one district with a Mexican-American population majority, they could
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Whether a racial group is politically cohesive depends on its

demonstrated propensity to vote as a bloc for candidates or issues
popularly recognized as being affiliated with the group's particularized
interests. The Supreme Court accepted the concept of particularized
34
interests in Whitcomb v. Chavis,340 and again in White v. Regester 1
and City ofMobile v. Bolden.342 Of course, minority voters may be said
to have picked a winner when a majority of that group voted for the
successful candidate.3 43 The only elections of consequence to this constitutional inquiry, however, would be those in which an overwhelming
majority of this group supported one or more candidates. 3 4 The dis-

tinction between a mere majority and an overwhelming bloc vote is no
more uncertain than is calculating the population variance needed to
establish a prima facie one-person, one-vote claim; neither, however, is
susceptible to precise formulation.
Receipt of the racial minority's bloc support would be the best,
and necessary, indication that a candidate is identified with the minor-

ity's particular interests. The candidate need not be a member of the
racial minority. In Bolden, for example, white candidates who received
black political endorsement and who did not win a majority in the first
election were assured of a devastating white majority backlash in the
runoff.3 45 Clearly, in order to trigger the at-large dilution phenome-

non, the candidatespublicly must be known to have the political backnot prove devaluation of their voting strength by the at-large plan. But neither could the
Mexican-American claim of advantage in an at-large system, due to their particular ability
to play coalition politics, undermine the entitlement of blacks to a district-election remedy
for the demonstrable dilution of their vote. Because the residentially dispersed Hispanic
voters could not be assured of having their choices succeed solely on the weight of their
ballots under either an at-large or a districted system, their contention that the at-large plan
offered them a greater degree of influence would fall short of a constitutional standard that
refuses to recognize a right to proportional representation and (solely due to considerations
ofjudicial restraint) restricts justiciable claims to those based on geographic grouping. Their
situation illustrates the truism that only one of the proportional representation electoral
forms can provide fair representation and equally effective voting strength to literally every
voter. Seesupra note 322. But the nonjusticiable Mexican-American claim ought not to bar
judicial relief for the larger and more residentially concentrated black community. However, if the smaller minority group can advance reliable evidence of its advantage in at-large
voting, a mixed plan-like the one the Court approved in Wise without squarely addressing
the Mexican-American claims-ought to be considered pursuant to the court's equitable
discretion in fashioning a remedy.
340. 405 U.S. at 134-35 & n.12.
341. 412 U.S. at 767.
342. 446 U.S. at 78-79.
343. See, e.g., Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 1976).
344. Of course, a general infrequency of bloc-vote situations on the part of blacks could
call into question their political cohesiveness.
345. 423 F. Supp. at 388-89.
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ing of the racial minority; otherwise, there would be no signal to
mobilize the majority's bloc vote and no opportunity to test the major346
ity's inclination to defeat minority-favored candidates.
The mere existence of bloc-voting on the part of racial groups, minority or majority, does not establish at-large dilution. There should
also be proof that the majority bloc vote consistently defeats clear minority choices. One district court, considering how much white crossover voting for black candidates would foreclose a finding that there
was a white bloc vote, concluded that any white vote sufficient to defeat
the combined strength of clear black support plus white crossovers constituted a majority bloc vote for the purpose of proving effective atlarge dilution. 347 This view is consistent with the standard of at-large
vote debasement proposed here. It is the ability of an antagonistic majority, regardless of defections from its ranks, consistently to defeat minority choices that defines the amount of bloc voting sufficient to
require judicial relief.
Similarly, what constitutes the "consistent" defeat of minority-favored candidates would require some exercise of judicial discretion. A
fifty percent success rate certainly would discredit an at-large dilution
claim, and even a substantially smaller success rate could do so if the
occasional minority candidate victories reflected a genuine ability of
minority voters to play coalition politics. 348 When token minority candidates were "cued" into office by the white political establishment and
did not reflect the exercise of real minority political choice, their victories would not outweigh the defeat of candidates chosen by the minority community. 34 9 On the other hand, the proposed standard
recognizes that, in a city or county with a long history of racial vote
346. In Mobile city elections held after the trial on remand from the Supreme Court, two
white incumbents, defendants in the Bolden case, found themselves in runoffs with white
challengers. Although neither incumbent had received strong black support in the first election, it was alleged that prior to the runoffs they made certain political promises to black
leaders in return for their support. Thereafter, a strong black vote helped the incumbents
win the runoff elections. See generally Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Admit
Post-trial Evidence and Attached Affidavits (Sept. 22, 1981), Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542
F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982). Under the standard of dilution proposed here, such lastminute deals with candidates not publicly identified with minority interests before the elections would not undermine longstanding evidence of racial vote dilution. The geographically isolated racial minority does not have equally effective voting strength if it cannot elect
some of its clear pre-election choices. Relegation to hopes of dealing with the lesser of evils
in the runoff still constitutes vote dilution.
347. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d at 1241 n.6.
348. For example, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, blacks regularly appeared on the Marion
County Democratic ticket and won when the Democrats won. 403 U.S. at 150 & n.29.
349. See, e.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d at 1241 n.6.
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dilution, the results of two or three recent elections may suffice to
demonstrate the current effectiveness of the minority electorate. Such
results would defuse constitutional attacks on the at-large scheme, at
least in the Reynolds sense.
What constitutes a "substantial period of time" over which atlarge racial vote dilution has been manifested also calls for considered
judicial development. More than a single, unsuccessful minoritychoice candidacy is needed to satisfy the proposed standard. In
Bolden, the trial court was able to study over fifteen years of black
candidacies, 3 50 but it would be dangerous, obviously, to suggest a hardand-fast rule. At the least, some clear minority choices must have run;
otherwise, there would be no evidence of either minority political cohesiveness or the at-large system's treatment of minority choices. 35 ' However, if no blacks, for example, had run for a particular city council,
black candidates or whites identified with black interests probably
would have sought election in overlapping county commission, school
board, state, or federal contests. Such election results may in appropriof how the at-large city elecate circumstances provide credible proof352
tions would dilute black voting strength.
The proposed standard does present certain "gray areas" and
could require a limited inquiry into local political dynamics. But such
an inquiry can be guided, under the proposed standard, by a much
more articulable, more fully realized notion of the nature of impermissible at-large dilution than is possible under either the subjective intent
standard of the Bolden plurality or the "access to the political process"
standard of White v. Regester.35 3 It certainly promises little more difficulty in terms of judicial manageability than does the still-fluctuating
one-person, one-vote rule, and it answers the Bolden plurality's questions about how a "theory of group representation could rationally be
350. 423 F. Supp. at 388-89; 542 F. Supp. at 1076-77.
351. If there have been no black candidacies at all in local elections, it may be that other
discriminatory devices can be shown to have intimidated or actively discouraged black political participation.
352. E.g., Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (S.D. Ala. 1976), affdper curiam,
575 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated andremanded sub nom. Williams v. Brown, 446 U.S.
236 (1980), reaff'd on remand, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
353. The proposed standard essentially sets up an effect-only test of the choice between
multimember and single-member districting, on the basis that such a test is necessary to
reconcile fourteenth and fifteenth amendment policy with the Reynolds v. Sims precedents.
But it leaves other voting practices subject to the general rule for proving fourteenth amendment violations, which, a majority of the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge held, requires
proof of invidious intent.
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Conclusion
As a constitutional rule, the principle of one person, one vote actually is derived from cases decided under the fifteenth amendment, the
explicit purpose of which is to protect against the abridgement of racial
minorities' voting rights. Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court created the right of population equality in Reynolds v. Sims, it also elevated that right to a position of constitutional primacy in the judicial
scrutiny of apportionment schemes. Although founded on the broader,
more complicated notion that each citizen is entitled to an equally
weighted and equally effective vote, the standard of one person, one
vote was made the starting point for analyzing districting plans because
it could be stated simply and could be managed with consistency by the
courts. Since first enunciating the one-person, one-vote rule, the Court
has recognized the obvious problem created for racial minorities by
multimember districts and at-large voting. Unlike the "sixth-grade
arithmetic" of one person, one vote, racial vote dilution could not be
measured without resorting to formulas that appeared either to make
multimember districts unconstitutional per se or to require racial proportional representation, propositions that were thought to offend
traditional American political values.
The Court has maintained that its refusal to strike down multimember plans that allegedly submerged the voting strength of racial
minorities is not to be understood as a denigration of the constitutional
status of the rights asserted, but was based on the Court's inability to
discover judicially manageable standards for detecting this form of
vote diminution. 355 In White v. Regester, the Court did find unconstitutional racial vote dilution caused by multimember districting, but it declined to explore and explicate any uniform constitutional standard for
judgment.3 5 6 In City of Mobile v. Bolden, a deeply divided Court offered at least four separate theories for managing at-large dilution,
none of which captured a majority vote.357 In Rogers v. Lodge, a sixmember majority accepted the view of the Bolden plurality that an invidious legislative purpose must be proved to invalidate an at-large
election scheme on constitutional grounds, but also reinstated the formulae of White v. Regester and Zimmer v. McKeithen as sufficient to
354.

446 U.S. at 78-79 n.26.

355.

See supra text accompanying notes 143 & 150.

356.

See supra text accompanying notes 155-60.

357.

See supra text accompanying notes 188-216.
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358
prove such intent.
Any evidentiary standard in racial vote dilution cases demanding
a greater quantum of proof than that required to challenge population
malapportionment works an intolerable inversion of constitutional and
historical priorities. Even the Reapportionment Cases' dissenters,
while denouncing the constitutional legitimacy of the population
equality rule, conceded that the first purpose of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments was safeguarding the rights of racial minorities.
The standard of proof adopted by the four-member Bolden plurality
and approved by the Rogers minority would demand that minority voters prove that an at-large plan has thepurpose as well as the effect of
diluting their votes. Population majorities, on the other hand, need
only show that their voting strength is effectively diminished by numerical inequality.
The Bolden formula, moreover, is unlikely to afford the desired
judicial manageability because it requires federal courts to look into
the subjective motives of lawmakers, an inquiry that courts have always recognized to be fraught with uncertainty and requiring too substantial an involvement in the legislative process. Similarly, the atlarge dilution standards offered by Justices White and Marshall are
vulnerable to criticisms of unmanageability because they require the
courts to make "an intensely local appraisal" of historical and sociological data concerning "access to the political process." The strict burden
of proof adopted by Justice Stevens from his earlier analysis of singlemember district gerrymandering would effectively immunize all atlarge schemes from challenges of racial discrimination. Thus, the theories advanced in Bolden inadequately advance the dual constitutional
policies of (1) assuring commensurate protection for the voting strength
of the racial majority and minorities alike, and (2) providing a judicially manageable standard of proof that neither outlaws multimember
districts per se nor requires proportional representation. The standard
proposed in this Article meets the foregoing criteria: (1) it measures the
same kind of apportionment-related vote debasement as does the oneperson, one-vote rule and does not demand additional inquiries into
the purpose of the plan; (2) it does not presume that every combination
of multimember districting and racial bloc voting will be objectionable,
but instead requires proof that systematic racial discrimination actually
results from the plan's operation; (3) it does not rely on comparisons
between the number of minority representatives and the size of the mi358. See supra text accompanying notes 223 & 237.
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nority population, nor does it presume that racial minorities will always
vote as a bloc or always support candidates of their own race, and
therefore does not demand proportional representation; and (4) by focusing almost solely on racial patterns readily discerned in election returns and in census data, it avoids excessive investigation of the
community's underlying historical, political, and social dynamics and
thus promises to be judicially manageable.
Like every other constitutional or legal standard of proof, the one
proposed here, once it is tested in the continuum of real world circumstances, may require refinement and modification. But the standard
does represent a serious response to the fundamental and unique dilemma presented by multimember districting in the development of the
Reynolds rule of one person, one vote as a constitutional requirement.
Other racially discriminatory voting practices, though no less injurious
and objectionable than at-large elections, may well be subject to different standards of proof. But in the now established jurisprudence of
Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny, multimember districts are a special
case. They confront federal courts with a compelling obligation to reconcile the rule of population equality with its constitutional and historical roots. An at-large plan at the same time perfectly satisfies the oneperson, one-vote requirement and affords the optimum conditions for
diluting the voting strength of racial minorities. The Supreme Court,
therefore, cannot shirk its duty to produce an evidentiary standard for
evaluating at-large schemes that does not subordinate the rights of racial minorities to the right of majority rule.
Rogers v. Lodge is now the controlling constitutional precedent,
and the statutory codification of the White-Zimmer standard in the
Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 is likely to reinforce the Supreme
Court's steadfast reluctance to examine the issue of at-large vote dilution in greater depth. But the Court should begin focusing on the critical, still unresolved question of under what circumstances at-large
schemes actually have the adverse racial impact that has only been presumed to exist in the cases to date, and should give up its constitutionally irrelevant preoccupation with what legislative reasons might justify
such discriminatory effect. Until then, litigants can look forward to capricious results in the courts, and local governments will continue to be
without the guidance or the incentive to correct the constitutionally unfair features of their election systems.

